The Global Economy Ten Years After十年后的世界经济

吉姆·奥尼尔

In the decade since the collapse of Lehman Brothers1 and the start of the global financial crisis， the world economy has registered stronger growth than many realize， owing in large part to China. But in the years ahead， global economic imbalances and troubling trends in the business world will continue to pose economic as well as political risks.

The global economy has not been nearly as weak as many seem to think. According to the International Monetary Fund2， the rate of real （inflation-adjusted） world GDP growth averaged 3.7% in 2000-2010， and would have been close to 4% if not for the so-called Great Recession. By comparison， the average annual growth rate so far this decade has been 3.5%， which is slightly lower than the average rate in the 2000s， but above the 3.3% rate in the 1980s and 1990s.

By my reckoning3， China has contributed an even larger share of global growth in this decade than it did in the last， with its GDP having almost tripled from $4.6 trillion at the end of 2008 to around $13 trillion today. That additional $8 trillion accounts for more than half of the increase in global GDP over the past decade.

I have long attributed the financial crisis to imbalances within and between the United States and China， the world’s two largest economies. While the US’s current-account deficit4 was close to 5% of GDP in 2008 （and closer to 7% in some quarters of 2007）， China was maintaining a whopping5 current-account surplus of 9% or higher.

Following the crisis， I predicted that the US and China would have to swap places to some extent over the course of the next decade. China needed to save less and spend more; and the US needed to save more and spend less. Judging by their current accounts today， both countries appear to have made significant progress. In 2018， China’s surplus will have fallen to around 0.5-1% of GDP， which is remarkable considering that its GDP has more than doubled since 2008. Equally remarkable， the US will register a deficit of 2-2.5% of GDP， which is within the 2-3% range that many economists consider sustainable.

Other global indicators， however， are not as encouraging. Back in 2008， the eurozone ran a current-account deficit of 1.5% of GDP， with Germany recording a surplus of around 5.5%. But Germany’s large surplus owed much to large deficits in other eurozone countries， and that imbalance gave rise to the euro crisis after 2009. Worryingly， Germany’s surplus has since ballooned to around 8% of GDP. As a result， the eurozone now has a surplus close to 3.5%， despite， and probably because of， years of weak domestic demand in the Mediterranean member states. This is surely a sign of further instability ahead. In fact， the slow-brewing6 crisis in Italy may be a harbinger7 of what awaits the bloc8.

A central feature of the economy prior to the financial crisis was the US housing bubble， which itself resulted from the financial sector’s invention of increasingly intricate9 （and dubious） methods of recycling global savings. A decade on， it bears mentioning that many “global cities” like London， New York， Sydney， and Hong Kong now have home prices that only a very small minority of their permanent residents can afford， owing to the growing demand from wealthy investors abroad.

But there are growing signs that housing prices in these and other cities may be undergoing a reversal. This may simply reflect actions taken by municipal governments to provide more affordable housing to their residents; but it also could indicate that marginally10 affluent new buyers are becoming scarcer.

To be sure， a gradual decline in house prices in these cities would be a welcome development in terms of economic and social equality. But one would search in vain for a time when declining home prices did not produce damaging side effects.

Having now assumed the chairmanship at Chatham House11， I am eager to encourage more research into how factors such as housing costs relate to larger issues of income and wealth inequality. To my mind， the world needs much better metrics12 for tracing these interconnections.

For example， it is clear that wealth inequality has increased much more than income inequality over the past decade， with the rapid rise in urban housing prices playing a central role. In many developed countries， including the United Kingdom， economic inequality is a serious problem. Yet in terms of income， the latest data show that inequality has actually fallen back to the （still-too-high） levels of the 1980s.

If common perceptions about inequality tend to inflate what is actually happening， that is because many companies’ top executives are earning increasingly massive sums relative to the workers under them. Such compensation packages13 can be rationalized in the context of share-price performance， but that hardly makes them justifiable.

This is another issue that I hope we will be studying at Chatham House. The strange equity-market rally14 that has been proceeding almost uninterrupted since 2009 has been fueled in large part by major corporations’ stock buybacks. In some important cases， companies have even issued debt to finance the repurchase of their shares.

Does the growing prevalence15 of buybacks explain why fixed investment and productivity have remained so weak across the West？ And might those macroeconomic factors explain some of the political upheavals16 in Western democracies such as the UK and the US in recent years？

On both counts， I suspect that the answer is yes. Unless we can recover a world in which business profits actually serve a purpose， the likelihood of more economic， political， and social shocks will remain intolerably high.

十年前，金融巨头雷曼兄弟破产，全球金融危机爆发，此后，世界经济增长之强劲出乎很多人意料，这很大程度上归功于中国的发展。不过，全球经济发展失衡、商业领域各种问题层出不穷仍会带来经济和政治风险。

全球经济并非很多人认为的那样疲软。根据国际货币基金组织的数据，2000年至2010年全球GDP实际年均增长率（考虑通货膨胀因素后）为3.7%，如果没有所谓经济大萧条的影响，此数字可能接近4%。相较而言，截至目前，这一个10年间全球GDP年均增长率为3.5%，略低于上一个10年，但是高于1980年代和1990年代的3.3%。

据我计算，中国在这10年在推动全球经济增长上的巨大贡献甚至超过了上一个10年，其GDP从2008年年底的4.6万亿增长到了如今的13万亿，几乎翻了3倍，共计8万多亿的增长额占过去10年全球GDP增长额的一半以上。

中国和美国是世界最大的两个经济体。我一直认为，金融危机是由两国内部和两国之间的经济发展不平衡所致。2008年，美国经常账户逆差接近其GDP的5%（2007年某些季度甚至接近7%）;中国的经常账户顺差则相当高，达到其GDP的9%或更高。

金融危机爆发后，我曾预测，中美两国的经济策略在此后十年中会出现一定程度的换位。中国需要减少储备增加支出，而美国需要增加储备减少支出。从目前经常账户的情况来看，中美两国都取得了卓越进展。2018年，中国经常账户顺差将降至其GDP的0.5%至1%，在2008年后GDP總额翻一番还要多的情况下，能保持如此成绩实属难得;美国经常账户逆差将占其GDP的2%至2.5%，许多经济学家认为经常账户逆差占GDP的2%至3%是符合可持续发展要求的，所以美国同样表现不俗。

然而，其他全球指标却不如人意。2008年，欧元区经常账户逆差为其GDP总量的1.5%，而德国则有约5.5%的顺差。但德国的大量顺差在很大程度上要归因于欧元区其他国家的大量逆差，而这种不平衡激发了2009年后的欧元危机。令人担忧的是，德国的顺差自此激增至GDP的约8%。结果，尽管地中海沿岸成员国多年内需不足（很可能也正因此），欧元区目前的顺差仍接近3.5%。这已明确提醒我们，不稳定因素仍将存在。事实上，缓慢酝酿中的意大利预算危机可能就预示着欧元区的未来。

金融危机之前，房地产泡沫是美国经济的主要特征之一，其形成是由于金融机构创造了各种愈发复杂（甚至可疑）的方法循环利用全球性储蓄资金。值得一提的是，在十年后的今天，富有的国外投资者对房地产的需求不断增加，导致伦敦、纽约、悉尼和香港这样的“全球化大都市”房价飞涨，当地永久居民已经很少有人能买得起房了。

但是，越来越多的迹象表明，各个城市的房价也许会下降。虽然这可能只是市级政府采取调控房价的措施来为居民提供价格适中的房源，但也表明本就比例不大的富裕阶层中新近买房的人越来越少。

诚然，要实现经济平等和社会公平，城市房价逐渐下降是好事。但事实上，房价下跌每次都会造成严重的负面影响，没有例外。

作为查塔姆研究所的现任主席，我迫切地想鼓励大家多去探讨房价等因素会如何影响收入和财富不均这样更大范围内的问题。我认为应该采用更准确全面的指标去追踪其中的关联。

举例而言，很明显，过去十年，财富不均加剧的程度远大于收入不均，城市房价飞涨是其主导因素。经济发展失衡是包括英国在内的发达国家所面临的严重问题。不过最新数据表明，目前收入失衡水平已经有所下降，回到了1980年代的水平，但其实当时的失衡程度在今天看来也是很高的。

大众对不平等现象的认知往往会夸大实际情况，这是因为相对普通员工而言，很多公司高管拿的是愈渐增长的巨额薪酬。尽管股票分红机制下存在这样的薪酬体系还算合理，但也难说得上公平公正。

这就是我希望查塔姆研究所探讨的另一个问题。自2009年起，股市一路走高，这很大程度上是大型企业回购股票促成的。在某些重要的案例中，我们发现企业不惜发行债券筹资回购股票。

那么，回购盛行是造成西方国家固定资产投资减少、生产力后劲不足的原因吗？上述宏观经济因素是导致近年来英美等西方民主政治动荡的原因吗？

我认为两者的答案都是肯定的。除非我们重建能真正有效利用营业利润的商业体系，否则爆发经济、政治和社会动荡的风险就会极高，令人难以承受。

（译者单位：北京航空航天大学）