The Russia-Turkey-Iran Coalition and Its Prospects

Dong Manyuan

Since the upheavals across West Asia and North Africa in 2011, the Russia-Turkey-Iran coalition has been the most prominent development in the Middle East. It has deeply affected major-power relations and the competition among regional forces, and suggests whether the Middle East can achieve peace, stability, common development and promote cooperation in various fields. The phenomenon is worth in-depth research for both its academic value and its practical significance to the evolving situation in the Middle East.

The Shaping of Russia-Turkey-Iran Coalition

The emergence of the Russia-Turkey-Iran coalition can be traced back to 2016. It was a direct result of the deterioration of US-Turkey relations, triggered by a failed military coup in Turkey in July that year aimed at overthrowing the rule of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. At the critical moment, Russia warned Erdoğan of the danger, which not only prevented his aircraft from being shot down, but also allowed him to take measures in advance. Erdoğan was therefore grateful for Russia’s help. Meanwhile, the Turkish president was told by his intelligence community that the US Central Command was involved in the coup, and that Fethullah Gülen, head of the religious movement Hizmet who was resident in the US, orchestrated the coup. Erdoğan, who adopted the intelligence and became furious with the US, approved the arrest of Graham Fuller, a former CIA official working in Turkey, and American pastor Andrew Brunson. In addition, the US support to the Kurdish armed forces in northern Syria encouraged the Kurdish independence movement in Turkey, which further infuriated Erdoğan. After repeated failure of negotiations with the US on the extradition of Gülen and the issue of Kurdish armed forces in northern Syria, Turkey decided to adjust its policy and seek external support to increase its bargaining power against the US. Turkey’s first move was to improve its relations with Russia that had deteriorated due to the “fighter jet incident,”1On November 24, 2015, an F-16 fighter jet of the Turkish air force shot down a Su-24 fighter jet of the Russian military, resulting in the death of the Russian pilot. The incident led to a rapid worsening of bilateral relations. Russia launched a series of sanctions against Turkey, and Turkey adopted counter-measures against Russia.and then it engaged in cooperation with Russia and Iran on Syria and other hotspot issues in the region.

Turkey’s foreign policy adjustment was in line with the geopolitical needs of Russia and Iran, and thus received positive responses from the two countries. Russia accepted Turkey’s apology for the “fighter jet incident” and praised Turkey for putting on trial the pilot responsible. In August 2016, Erdoğan visited Russia where he met with President Vladimir Putin and declared that the bilateral relations were “back on track.” In September, they met again during the G20 summit in Hangzhou. In October, Putin attended the World Energy Conference in Istanbul and signed an agreement with Erdoğan to build the TurkStream gas pipeline.2The TurkStream gas pipeline project was launched at the beginning of 2017, which includes the construction of two gas pipelines that cross the Black Sea and connect Russia and Turkey, destined for Europe. Its aggregate annual volume of gas transportation is 31 billion cubic meters. The project is expected to start operations by the end of 2019.The TurkStream project not only reinforced Russia’s competitive edge in punishing Ukraine with the “natural gas card,” but also met Turkey’s gas demand and enabled it to collect fees for transporting gas to European countries, creating a win-win situation. The assassination of Russian Ambassador to Turkey Andrei Karlov in Ankara in December did not strain bilateral relations, but instead forged a consensus on counter-terrorism between the two countries and prompted their cooperation in the fields of intelligence exchanges, personnel training and mutual assistance in combating terrorism.

As for Iran-Turkey relations, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and President Hassan Rouhani both congratulated President Erdoğan on defeating the coup and supported the various stabilization measures taken by the Turkish government. They expressed willingness for Iran to deepen cooperation with Turkey in the fields of energy, trade and investment, and make joint efforts with Turkey to combat terrorism and separatism, including fighting against the Kurdish separatist forces in both countries. Responding to the Iranian leaders’ friendly gestures, Erdoğan made remarks on several occasions, thanking Iran for its support in ending the coup. He also expressed firm support for the Iran nuclear deal reached in July 2015, and took substantive measures such as importing Iranian oil.

In January 2017, Russia, Turkey and Iran launched the first round of the Astana peace talks, and actively committed themselves to promoting political settlement of the Syria issue, which was later recognized by the international community as the “Astana peace process” (renamed “Nur-Sultan peace process” in March 2019). By August 2019, the three countries had held 13 rounds of peace talks, greatly contributing to cooling down the Syrian war and exploring a political solution. In November 2017, the three heads of state met for the first time in Sochi, creating a summit mechanism among the three countries. So far, the three leaders have met many times on a wide range of topics, including how to respond to US pressure, how to promote political settlement of the Syria issue while protecting the three countries’ interests in Syria, how to deal with relations with European countries, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel, how to play a role in regional hotspot issues, and how to deepen cooperation among the three countries in energy, trade, investment, counter-terrorism, nuclear power, arms trade, infrastructure and people-to-people exchanges. They have reached important consensus on these issues, which brings about a number of joint actions with crucial strategic implications.

From the interactions among Russia, Turkey and Iran after the failed coup in Turkey in 2016, it can be seen that the start of the Astana peace process and the trilateral summit mechanism marked the formation of Russia-Turkey-Iran coalition.

The Role of Russia-Turkey-Iran Coalition

The Russia-Turkey-Iran coalition is essentially an alignment of interests, which means the three countries, based on the consistency of their major interests and common perception of strategic objectives at a particular time, have been conducting consultations and cooperation on a wide range of issues. Although the coalition has never officially declared itself against the United States, most of the issues and areas involved in the tripartite cooperation have reflected resistance to US hegemonism, which has hindered the US strategy of controlling the Middle East and undermining Russia’s influence in Eurasia, and also caused troubles to US allies in the region.

Reversing the Syrian situation and gaining geopolitical advantages

In the early days of the Syrian war when the Bashar al-Assad government was struggling, the United States, the European Union, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar were all committed to overthrowing the Bashar regime. By providing funding, weaponry, personnel training and other kinds of support to various anti-government forces, they fostered a number of offshore “shadow governments” with different interests and appeals. External forces intervening in the Syrian war forced the Bashar government to continuously retreat, and resulted in the rise and expansion of terrorism and extremism in over half of Syria’s provinces, even with spillover effects in Iraq, Yemen, and the Sinai Peninsula. Syria witnessed its land being ravaged and people displaced, with millions of refugees pouring into neighboring countries such as Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon and even into Europe, resulting in an unprecedented humanitarian crisis.

The chaos in Syria provided an opportunity for Kurdish ethnic separatism. In June 2012, the Kurdish armed forces in northern Syria announced the establishment of the “Democratic Federation of Northern Syria” with an autonomous government sitting at Qamishli, its professed capital. They also held elections in 2014, established legislative and judicial institutions, promulgated a constitution and other laws, and expanded the People’s Protection Units (YPG) and the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ), the two armed forces that constitute the backbone of the Syrian Democratic Forces with support from the United States. The political and military cadres of the “Democratic Federation of Northern Syria” were mainly from the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) in the name of the Democratic Union Party (PYD)3“Crisis in Syria Emboldens Country’s Kurds,” BBC News, July 28, 2012; “Syrian Kurdish Leader: We Will Respect Outcome of Independence Referendum,” ARA News, August 3, 2016.to disguise real control by the PKK. In terms of community building and citizen management, the “Democratic Federation of Northern Syria” was guided by Kurdish nationalism and democratic socialism advocated by Abdullah Öcalan.4Joost Jongerden, The Settlement Issue in Turkey and the Kurds: An Analysis of Spatial Policies, Modernity and War, Leiden: Brill, 2007, pp.57-71.

The rise of terrorism and the Kurdish ethnic group in northern Syria not only provided Turkey with a pretext for its deep involvement in the Syrian unrest, but also sowed the seeds of Turkey-US strife. The 2016 failed coup in Turkey further ignited the powder keg of Turkey-US tensions, which became a watershed for the bilateral relationship and led to the emergence of Russia-Turkey-Iran coalition. The situation in Syria has reversed since the three countries formed an alignment based on their shared interests. Turkey changed the objective of its Syria policy from overthrowing the Bashar government to destroying the “Democratic Federation of Northern Syria.” Under the banner of “supporting Syria’s territorial integrity,” Turkey proclaimed that it “does not oppose the Syrian government preventing the establishment of an independent Kurdish state,” and tried to undermine the Kurdish armed forces by the hand of Syrian government forces. Coupled with strong support from Russia and Iran, the Syrian government forces completely turned the tide on the battlefield. By early 2018, the Syrian government had controlled about 65% of Syrian territory, and dealt a heavy blow to various anti-government forces in Eastern Ghouta, the Yarmouk Camp and three southern provinces. In early August 2019, with joint efforts from Russia, Turkey and Iran, the various stakeholders reached an agreement on the composition of Syria’s new Constitution Drafting Committee in the 13th round of the “Nur-Sultan peace process,” marking a key step toward a political settlement of the Syria issue. Both the battlefield situation and the diplomatic mediation demonstrated that the opposition forces, regardless of external support behind them, have little hope of overthrowing Bashar.

Russia, Turkey and Iran have gained strong geopolitical advantages by aligning interests and deeply involving themselves in Syria’s chaotic situation. For Russia, Syria is the only country in the Middle East where it is able to establish military presence, which will enable it to play a bigger role in the region. Russia’s strong support on the battlefield is the primary reason why the Bashar government has not collapsed. In return, the Syrian government has allowed Russia to use its Khmeimim Air Base and Tartus military port on a long-term basis, in the hope that Russia will maintain its military presence in Syria. For Iran, through the direct participation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force and the mobilization of Lebanon’s Hezbollah in the Syrian war, it has also played a key role in helping the Syrian government reverse the setback it suffered on the battlefield, and won gratitude from the Syrian government, which further consolidated the bilateral alliance. While Iran has the intention to maintain long-term military presence in Syria, the Bashar government is also counting on the continuous Iranian presence to strengthen the Shiite Crescent,5The Shiite Crescent was formed after the Iraq War in 2003 when Saddam Hussein’s Sunni government was toppled and the Shiite gained power in Iraq. The Crescent stretches from Lebanon in the west to Iran in the east, with Syria and Iraq in the middle. This forms a complete geopolitical region, where Iran plays a key role in politics, economy, military, and religion. In addition, Shiite Muslims in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Yemen are seen as providing external support for the Crescent.of which Iran is the core. For Turkey, since the defeat of the coup in 2016, it has launched a series of large-scale military operations such as “Euphrates Shield” and “Olive Branch” under the name of counter-terrorism. It has then occupied the northern Syrian regions of Al-Bab, Azaz, Jarabulus and Afrin, fostered pro-Turkish regimes there, and invested in the construction of roads, hospitals, schools, shopping areas, parks, electric power, water supply and other facilities to establish its long-term presence. It has also made a deal with Russia through the “Nur-Sultan peace process” and taken sole responsibility for the management of Idlib’s military buffer zone. In the province, which it regards as its sphere of influence, it has fostered pro-Turkish armed forces such as the Free Syrian Army, and reformed and incorporated extremist armed forces such as the Tahrir al-Sham, the Jaysh al-Islam (Army of Islam) and the Jaysh al-Izza (Army of Glory). Starting from December 2018, Turkey has been mobilizing heavy troops from within its border and making deployments along the northwest of Manbij, while Erdoğan vowed to “bury” the Kurdish armed forces in Manbij and to the east of the Euphrates River. Should Turkey succeed in destroying the “Democratic Federation of Northern Syria,” 27% of Syria’s territory would be under Turkey’s long-term occupation. The establishment of long-time military presence in Syria, with geopolitical significance, would help Turkey gain leverage in its power play with the United States, Russia, the European Union, Iran, Saudi Arabia and other stakeholders of the Syria issue, and give it a unique voice to determine the future of Syria.

Taking advantage of disputes between the US and regional allies and dividing the US alliance system

The alliance system is the basis for the United States to maintain its dominance in the Middle East. With the Trump administration trying to maintain US dominance in the region at a low cost, the United States is now relying on its allies to do more and reduce its own burden. However, it is the internal strife inside the US alliance system that has been exploited by the Russia-Turkey-Iran coalition and hence hindered the US Middle East strategy on every front.

In May 2017, Trump chose the Middle East as the destination for his first international trip as US President. In Saudi Arabia, Trump delivered a speech outlining the US Middle East strategy, which includes the following points. First, safeguarding Israel’s absolute security, and trying to find a new solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and strive for a breakthrough in Arab-Israeli relations on this basis. Second, consolidating the United States’ regional alliance system, strengthening unity among its allies, and making joint efforts to contain and bring down Iran, while ensuring the Gulf Cooperation Council to play its full role as the core platform for containing Iran. Third, counter-terrorism is closely related to containing Iran and destroying the Shiite Crescent and it must be done in a coordinated way. As the “ultimate origin” of terrorism, Iran is relying on the Crescent to undermine peace and stability in the Middle East. Therefore, containing Iran would be the “greatest counter-terrorism effort at the root.” Supporting the Syrian opposition to overthrow the Bashar regime would be a key part of the containment and an integral part of the United States’ Middle East counterterrorism efforts, and serve as a breakthrough in the attempt to destroy the Shiite Crescent. Regional US allies should pay more, contribute more and invest more resources in containing Iran, at the same time fighting against terrorism and extremism at their own expense. Fourth, expelling Russian presence and influence from the Middle East would be of great significance to the achievement of peace and stability in the region. Regional allies are urged to maintain strategic vigilance against Russia, coordinate with the US and engage in cooperation in this regard.

However, immediately after Trump’s visit to the Middle East, disputes within the Gulf Cooperation Council turned white-hot. In June 2017, Saudi Arabia accused Qatar of supporting terrorism, leaning toward Iran and “interfering in its internal affairs,” severed its diplomatic relations with Qatar and imposed a land and air blockade on it. Russia, Turkey and Iran responded quickly to the incident. Russia emphasized that all countries, large or small, should be equal, and that disputes between countries should be resolved through negotiation and consultation. Russia also expressed its willingness to cooperate with Saudi Arabia and Qatar simultaneously in energy, trade and investment, and sell arms to the two countries, including high-end fighter jets and air defense missile systems, to enhance the two countries’ defense capabilities. During Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s visit to Doha in October of the same year, Russia and Qatar signed an agreement on military technological cooperation. Turkish President Erdoğan also made a speech calling for respect for Qatar’s sovereignty and security interests and warning external forces to “refrain from overthrowing Qatar’s legitimate government.” The Turkish Grand National Assembly adopted two resolutions consecutively on expanding the size and extending the term of Turkish forces stationed in Qatar, after which Turkish troops were rapidly deployed into Qatar. On the part of Iran, its Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei said he would not be indifferent to “friendly neighbors being bullied.” In view of temporary difficulties in the supply of daily necessities in Qatar, Iran immediately offered assistance by providing goods by sea and air to restore Qatar’s market stability. Meanwhile, Iran also sent a delegation to Qatar to discuss deepening mutually beneficial cooperation in the South Pars offshore gas field.

With strong support from Russia, Turkey and Iran, Qatar responded to the diplomatic crisis with more confidence and composure. Qatar reiterated its independence in domestic and foreign affairs against external pressure but also expressed the willingness to engage in dialogue with Saudi Arabia and other countries on an equal basis to ease tensions. Given the decisive influence of the United States on Saudi Arabia, in order to prevent Saudi Arabia from sending troops to overthrow the Qatari royal family, Qatar took the initiative to offer a large military purchase order of $12 billion to the US and started the expansion of Al Udeid Airport, where the largest US air base in the Middle East is located. Qatar would assume full cost of the expansion, and it also promised to “permanently bear” the cost of US troops stationed on its territory. In December 2018, Qatar’s Energy Minister Saad Sherida al-Kaabi announced at the Doha Forum that Qatar would invest $20 billion in natural gas projects in Texas in 2019. US President Donald Trump expressed satisfaction with the Qatari initiative to “rely on the United States.” Senior officials such as US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and then National Security Advisor John Bolton also indicated that the national security of Gulf Cooperation Council countries, including Qatar, would not be threatened.

Qatar also returned favor to Russia, Turkey and Iran. In July 2018, Qatar announced that it would purchase anti-tank weapons and largecaliber artillery from Russia, and expressed interest in purchasing the S-400 anti-aircraft missile system. In August 2018, Qatar injected $15 billion into the Turkish central bank to help Turkey get through the turmoil in the lira foreign exchange market. In response to the United States’ unilateral withdrawal from the Iran nuclear agreement, the Qatari government said that the agreement would help prevent a nuclear arms race in the Middle East and maintain stability in the Gulf region. The escalation of Saudi-Qatar tensions and the disappearance of their mutual trust have put an end to the era of Saudi Arabia commanding everything within the Gulf Cooperation Council. Russia, Turkey and Iran have further divided the Council as Oman and Kuwait refused to participate in the Saudi-led blockade and continued to maintain friendly relations with Qatar. The tensions have also made it difficult for the Council to effectively contain Iran, leading to a setback for the US Middle East strategy.

Sowing division inside NATO and weakening its capability to contain Russia

In the post-Soviet era, the United States has still regarded Russia as a strategic rival. It initiated NATO’s eastward expansion and squeezed Russia’s strategic space in Eurasia. In terms of size, Turkey has the second-largest military force in NATO after the United States and serves as a strategic barrier to contain Russia in the southeastern wing of NATO. Turkey had been playing such a role until the emergence of Russia-Turkey-Iran coalition.

After the emergence of the tripartite coalition, Turkey intentionally ignored NATO’s mission of deterring Russia, deepened its all-round cooperation with Russia, and constantly undermined NATO’s integration and cohesion, especially in the military field, in order to increase its leverage against the United States. In November 2017, Turkey signed an agreement with Russia to purchase the S-400 air defense missile system, whose delivery began in July 2019. In response, the Trump administration exerted tremendous pressure on Turkey, including terminating the F-35 fighter contract, disqualifying Turkish military industrial businesses from producing F-35 fighter jet parts, threatening to impose tariffs on Turkish exports to the US, and imposing sanctions on several big Turkish banks.

Against the US pressure, Erdoğan responded strongly by asserting Turkey’s right as a sovereign country to decide its own military purchases. At the same time, Turkey also sent a flexible signal to the US that if the price was reasonable, it would be willing to buy the US-made Patriot air defense missile system, or even the THAAD system, but it would be “impossible” to cancel the S-400 contract. If the US imposed sanctions on Turkey, Turkey would consider purchasing the Russia-made S-500 air defense missile system and the Su-57 fighter instead, and consider prohibiting the US from using the NATO military base in Turkey. In August 2019, the US Department of Defense issued a statement, saying that it took note of the delivery of the S-400 system, but if Turkey would refrain from using this system, the US would consider resuming the F-35 fighter jet contract and restoring Turkey’s qualification to produce the fighter jets’ spare parts. It would also consider selling the Patriot and THAAD air defense systems to Turkey at preferential prices and engage in security cooperation with Turkey in northern Syria. Turkey responded to the US proposal that it would cooperate with the US in arms purchase, but the Turkish military must be equipped with the S-400 system to enhance its air defense capability. So far, the S-400 crisis has reached a deadlock again. In contrast, the Russian naval fleets passed through the Bosporus Strait and the Dardanelles Strait several times, where they traveled to Syria or cruised in the Mediterranean Sea without encountering hindrance.

Enhancing the three countries’ international and regional influence

After the Ukraine crisis, the United States and other Western countries imposed comprehensive sanctions against Russia, squeezed Moscow’s strategic space in Eurasia, and disrupted Putin’s plan to build a strong country. In order to reverse its strategic passivity, Russia has concentrated its limited resources in the Middle East where the weaknesses of the US are more exposed, in an attempt to create difficulties for the US in the Middle East and force the US to trade off with itself on the Eurasian continent. From the impact of Russia’s involvement in the Middle East, although Russia has not yet forced the US to compromise on Ukraine and other issues, its influence in the Middle East continues to grow and its competition with the US is expected to determine the future direction of regional structure, breaking the long-term US monopoly over Middle East affairs. Russia has both geopolitical wins and substantial gains in arms sales, nuclear power, energy and other fields, such as selling the S-300, S-400, Mikoyan MiG-29, Su-30 and large-caliber artillery to Egypt, Qatar and Turkey, building nuclear power plants, and getting involved in the political settlement of the Libya issue. By involving itself in the Middle East, Russia has effectively alleviated its domestic economic difficulties, and consolidated its strategic presence in the Middle East and the Mediterranean Rim.

Under Erdoğan’s long-term rule, Turkey has formulated strategic visions up to 2023 and even 2053, determined to enter the ranks of top 10 countries in the world on the 100th anniversary of its founding, and become a world power on the 600th anniversary of the Ottoman Empire’s conquest of Constantinople. With the year 2023 approaching, the setback in its bid to join the European Union, the failure of its “zero-problem neighborhood policy,” the enduring dispute with the United States, as well as refugees and domestic security challenges, Turkey is feeling greater strategic anxiety and is determined to go all out to meet these challenges. At present, Turkey is stepping up investment in two strategic directions, namely, the Middle East and Asia. In the Middle East, Turkey, Russia and Iran have formed a coalition based on shared interests, aimed at competing against the US-Israel-Saudi axis and expanding the space for strategic maneuvering. For example, Turkey has established long-term military presence in Syria, Qatar and the Horn of Africa (Somalia), intervened in the Libya War, supported the Libyan Government of National Accord in the west, extended its reach into North Africa, and sowed divisions in the Gulf Cooperation Council to reap benefits (Qatar has invested $15 billion in Turkey). In Asia, Turkey carried out an “Eastward policy,” prioritizing expanding economic, trade and investment cooperation with China, Japan, South Korea, India and the ASEAN countries, with a view to realizing its “2023 strategic vision.” In terms of effect, Turkey’s efforts in the above two strategic directions have yielded remarkable results. First, Turkey’s influence in the Middle East has greatly increased, which can no longer be neglected by other stakeholders. Second, major Asian economies have attached great importance to cooperation with Turkey. A number of major projects have been initiated in Turkey, including the third strait bridge, the first strait tunnel and the new Istanbul airport.

President of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (center), President of Russia Vladimir Putin (right) and President of Iran Hassan Rouhani attend the joint press conference after their meeting in Ankara on September 16, 2019. At the summit aimed to find a lasting truce in Syria, the leaders agreed steps to ease tensions in northwest Syria’s Idlib region.

By relying on its coalition with Russia and Turkey, Iran has significantly strengthened its ability to resist US pressure and maneuver in the region. It has safeguarded the legitimacy of the Iran nuclear agreement, cooperated with Russia, the European Union, China, Turkey and India, and made the decision to suspend the implementation of some provisions of the agreement in view of the US “maximum pressure” and “long-arm jurisdiction.” With measures such as improving the abundance of enriched uranium, making breakthroughs in the enriched uranium reserves and increasing the number of centrifuges, it has demonstrated its ability to develop dual-use nuclear technology. By seizing British tankers and launching missiles, it has demonstrated its ability to effectively control the Strait of Hormuz. It has established long-term military presence in Syria in the name of counterterrorism, coexists in a friendly way with Russia and Turkey in Syria, and cooperates closely with the Syrian government and Hezbollah to ensure that the Shiite Crescent will not be cut off. It has solidified ties with the Iraqi Shiites and profoundly influenced the political situation in Iraq. It has generously supported Hamas, and sought to occupy the moral high ground on the Palestinian issue. It upholds the idea of “defusing humanitarian disasters” and covertly supports the Yemeni Houthi armed forces, making Saudi Arabia’s southern wing more vulnerable. With the above measures, Iran has deterred Europe and also the US and its regional allies. Europe dares not follow the US “maximum pressure” campaign on Iran, and the US and its regional allies attempt to avoid military conflicts with Iran.

Resilience of the Coalition

The historical grievances and disputes that exist among Russia, Turkey and Iran give the coalition the distinct characteristics of pragmatism and utilitarianism, but that does not affect the strategic role and vitality of the coalition.

The driving force of the US factor

Russia, Turkey and Iran all harbor deep grievances with the United States. In particular, the US-Russia and US-Iran disputes are structural in nature. In order to maintain its dominance in the world, the US is making every effort to prevent Russia, one of the two erstwhile superpowers, from regaining its status and influence, but the restoration to its superpower status is precisely the goal that Russia is striving for. Therefore, it is in line with US hegemonic thinking and logic to prevent Russia from achieving prosperity and strength, while breaking through the US obstruction and containment and reentering the superpower ranks is in line with the thinking and logic of Russia’s national rejuvenation. Iran’s ambition to become the leader of the Islamic world and the biggest power in the Middle East collides head-on with the United States’ attempts to exercise sole control in the Middle East. Therefore, the US sees Iran as a target for containment, forcing Iran to engage in a long-term power competition with the United States. The dispute between the United States and Turkey also runs deep due to the US disrespecting Turkey’s core interests and national dignity. Under Trump’s “America First” policy, US bullying is particularly prominent in its relations with Turkey. Since Russia, Turkey and Iran all see their major interests challenged by the United States, a challenge that is difficult for each of them to respond alone, the three countries have chosen to put aside their historical grievances, aligned their respective geopolitical, economic and military comparative advantages, and alleviated or even resolved their practical disputes through dialogue and consultation, thus forming cooperation in multiple areas and platforms on regional and international issues under bilateral and trilateral frameworks, with the aim of safeguarding their respective major interests. Russia, Turkey and Iran have realized that it is in each country’s best interests to stay together rather than fight alone.

Consensus on cooperation despite taking advantage of one another.

The Russia-Turkey-Iran cooperation is mixed with self-interest where each party hopes that the other two will bear the larger brunt of US pressure in order to save their own economic and military resources. For example, since May 2019, a number of countries have seen their oil tankers or merchant ships attacked in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, and the Saudi oil fields and refineries have also been attacked by cruise missiles and drones. The United States and Saudi Arabia pointed to Iran as the responsible party and imposed sanctions on the Iranian central bank and sovereign wealth funds, and the US also increased the number of troops participating in the air defense of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, while stepping up building an escort coalition against Iran. In this context, Turkey adopted a policy of detachment, pushing Iran and Russia to the forefront of competition with the US. Both Iran and Russia well understood Turkey’s “selfish” behavior, but chose not to expose it since the three countries could still cooperate on other issues. Russia, Turkey and Iran also harbor different goals on the Syria issue and hold their respective national interests as paramount, but they understand one another and will try to meet each other’s concerns. Russia’s support to the Bashar government is to maintain its strategic fulcrum and military presence in the Middle East. Iran’s support to Bashar is out of its need to compete with Saudi Arabia in the Middle East and to ensure the integrity of the Shiite Crescent. Turkey’s cooperation with Russia and Iran on the Syria issue is aimed at establishing long-term military presence and sphere of influence and enhancing its voice and regional influence on the Syria issue, and more importantly, at destroying the Kurdish “Democratic Federation of Northern Syria.” After more than three years of “cooperation,” the three countries have largely achieved their respective goals, and they intend to continue cooperation in order to consolidate their geopolitical gains.

The coalition’s strong counter-division capability

The Russia-Turkey-Iran coalition has effectively constrained the Middle East strategy of the United States, continuously forcing the US to pay more attention to and even reallocate resources to the region. For example, Trump announced the withdrawal of all ground troops from Syria in December 2018, but as Turkey threatened to attack the “Democratic Federation of Northern Syria” and make relevant military deployments during the United States’ withdrawal, Trump had to announce in February 2019 that he would “indefinitely” retain some US troops in Syria. Also, in order to force the US to lift sanctions, Iran has provided cruise missiles and drones to the Houthi armed forces in Yemen, boosting the combat effectiveness of the Houthi forces and posing a real threat to oil facilities, ports and airports in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. As of September 2019, the Houthi armed forces launched more than 200 missiles to strike Saudi oil pipelines, the Abqaiq refinery, the Khurais oil field, the Riyadh International Airport and other targets, and they also used drones for many operations. In addition, several oil tankers in the Fujairah Port in the United Arab Emirates caught fire during the attacks. The above developments forced the Trump administration to increase military forces to the Gulf region three times in 2019, and deploy combat forces, including aircraft carrier battle groups, B-52 bombers, F-35 and F-22 fighter jets, Patriot and THAAD air defense systems and ground troops. It disrupted Trump’s attempt to maintain the alliance system and dominate the regional agenda at a low cost. In order to alleviate its burden, the United States has tried to divide the Russia-Turkey-Iran coalition through diplomatic means, but its repeated attempts have been futile. For example, the US used Syria’s “chemical weapons incident” several times to stimulate Turkey to differ with Russia and Iran, but it was unsuccessful in driving a wedge among the three countries. The US also supported Turkey’s opposition to Russia and Syria’s attempt to round up and destroy the separatist forces in Idlib. However, Russia and Turkey managed to shelve their differences and reached an agreement to establish a “demilitarized zone” to ensure their respective interests and extend the coalition’s cooperation in Syria at the same time.

The coalition’s external support

The Russia-Turkey-Iran coalition has won itself the sympathy and support from some regional countries and non-state actors as an opponent to unilateralism, Western centralism and various versions of “double standards.” Despite facing threats from the United States, Saudi Arabia and Israel, some countries have boldly engaged in cooperation with Russia, Turkey and Iran, even coordinating with them in political, economic, military and religious arenas. Oman, Kuwait and Lebanon are among the countries expressing sympathy for the Russia-Turkey-Iran coalition. Countries that have cooperated with the coalition include Syria, Iraq, Qatar, India and Central Asian countries. Non-state actors which have showed support and engaged in cooperation with the coalition include the Shiite militia in Iraq and Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Palestine, the Houthi armed forces in Yemen, and the transnational Muslim Brotherhood.

Conclusion

With a more complex Middle East situation, US-Russia competition remains the main line with two distinct camps: one is the US-Israel-Saudi Arabia axis, and the other is the Russia-Turkey-Iran coalition. Both are based on shared interests and supported by external partners. The two camps compete with each other with complicated implications, as great-power competition intertwines with the Arab-Israeli disputes and the Saudi-Iran geopolitical competition, thus accelerating structural changes in the region. Given the Trump administration’s reluctance to put much investment into the Middle East, regional powers have seen their maneuvering space expand and their actions less constrained, leading to greater tensions in the region. The geopolitical competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran is changing in favor of the latter, mainly due to the escalation of the Saudi–Turkey dispute. Saudi Arabia believes that Turkey, Iran and regional terrorist forces constitute an “evil triangle” that undermines regional peace and stability, and accuses Turkey of attempting to rebuild an “Ottoman Caliphate” in the Middle East. This has prompted Saudi Arabia to compete with the two regional powers of Iran and Turkey at the same time, and in turn increased the cohesion of the Russia-Turkey-Iran coalition. In the future, the Russia-Turkey-Iran coalition will continue to play a strategic role and remain a thorn for the United States. While the US will try to dismantle the coalition by focusing on luring Turkey away, but it is likely to be a futile endeavor.