U.S. “Pivot to Asia” Faces Numerous Problems Ahead

Hong Yuan



U.S. “Pivot to Asia” Faces Numerous Problems Ahead

Hong Yuan

Research Fellow Institute of American Studies Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

It is generally believed that U.S. pivot to Asia or the rebalancing in Asia-Pacific derives from its psychology, which is more fear of China’s rise than China’s wish to challenge America. So far there is no effective evidence showing that China is challenging the United States, but fear of China can be seen everywhere in the United States. Therefore, the biggest global objective of the United States is to siege, check and contain China. However, this is not accurate description. The main strategic target of the United States is to prevent China from being its next strategic rival. As a result, economically it uses measures including the TPP to slow down China’s growth, and militarily its pivot to Asia aims to prevent China from becoming a world-class military power and keep China within the first and second island chains.

However, the wish to return to Asia is one thing, the capability of changing the balance of power in Asia is another. They are two totally different concepts. Does the United States have the strategic determination and the ability to ally different parties to realize this strategic transformation?

I. America’s real challenge is internal rather than China-driven.

The U.S. decline is due to endogenous reasons and the general declining. A few Chinese and Americans do believe the decline of America as a great country, but many people in the international community do not buy it. The deeper reason is that the United States has passed from the competition-based free capitalist system via monopoly capitalist system featuring industrial monopoly to the current imperialist stage of global financial monopoly by using financial means to control industries, geopolitics and military of other countries after the collapse of the Bretton Woods System in the 1970s. However, this also leads to depletion of American power: 85% of its population has moved away from material production. By simply relying on the lopsided development of finance, information and other service sectors, the military and high-tech industries, the United States has seen hollowing-out of its manufacturing industry and manufacturing population, which are caught up by other third world countries in manufacturing. Given this megatrend, efforts of the Obama Administration to revitalize the manufacturing industry are doomed to be ephemeral. The real challenge for the United States is problems in its development model. The U.S. pivot to Asia is because of its fear that the increase of China’s economic aggregate may surpass that of America to become the biggest economy at around 2030, thus breaking the American legend, which will lead to the loss of basic trust in the U.S. dollar and deal a deadly blow to American hegemony over global finance. Therefore, the root causes for the decline of American power and its strength no longer allow for significant transfer of strategic forces. However, facing its own decline and the rapid development of China, the United States finds itself unleashing its anger on China. It feels that it has to challenge China, and perceives it as its next strategic rival so as to solve its own problems. Therefore, the logic of U.S. pivot to Asia is absurdly deviation from reality, which, as a result, cannot justify itself and is doomed to be futile.

II. The Middle East, Central Asia and Europe will not allow sudden withdrawal of America.

“Pivot to Asia” will necessarily force the United States to move limited strategic resources from other parts of the world to Asia, which will lead to the decline of American power in those regions. As a matter of fact, Middle East and Central Asia have already been suffering from the after-effects of American withdrawal, with the influence and reputation of America much weakened there. At the same time, since China’s strategic room in the neighborhood has been effectively squeezed, it will have to extend to areas from which the United States has withdrawn, thus starting the process for China to “go out and squeeze America”.

Secondly, America’s traditional strategic focus is in Europe and the Middle East. Once the United States strategically withdraws from the Middle East, the power vacuum may lead to local situation getting out of hand, which might threaten the survival of Israel, the U.S. staunch ally in the region, and cause serious dissatisfaction from the Jewish community. The lobbyists for Jewish interests will do everything they can to force the Democrats to brake and change course. While in Europe, the withdrawal of America will increase the power of Germany, a past hegemon in Europe, which will occupy the strategic room left by America and see its influence rapidly expand. Once Europe is under German leadership, it will steadily move towards an integrated and unified “United States of Europe”, which is something the American fundamental interests in the strategic focus will definitely not allow.

III. War on values: cornerstone of the Asia-Pacific strategy, and Japan being friend or foe

（1）In terms of values, the U.S. strategic rebalance, in essence, is the fight between the Western civilization and the Chinese civilization. However, as a cornerstone of the U.S. strategy of balance in Asia-Pacific, Japan has put its civilization on the same par as the Western civilization. The United States, representative of Western civilization, has failed to integrate the Japanese civilization. Its democratic and constitutional system got scared and defeated in front of the emperor system of Japan! It is a classic example of winning the battle but losing the war of cultural integration. Furthermore, as too young a country, the United States has never succeeded in civilizational integration except for the successful transformation of Germany, which belongs to the same cultural system. Given that the culture of Japanese emperor system has not changed from that prior to World War II, the United States will have to face the possibility of another war with Japan looming in the future.

（2）The United States does not have enough strength to match its ambitions of “strategic rebalancing”, so it has to rely on the financial, physical and military power of Japan. This, plus the American economy’s demand on Japan, obliges President Obama to make use of political statement to get economic and geopolitical cooperation from Japan.

First of all, in terms of the TPP, the economic aspect of its pivot to Asia, America’s protection over the Diaoyu Island has gained no concession from Japan. The United States is not only a modern industrial and technological power, it is also a big agricultural country. Abe’s persistent position on not relaxing customs duties on five categories of agricultural produce has greatly frustrated Obama. Secondly, America’s sending the strategic gift package to Japan shows that its declining power falls short of its ambition to have strategic rebalance in Asia. To prevent its ambition from premature death, it has to rely on Japan’s economic and military power and give Japan a blank check that has no legitimacy in America to trade off for Japanese concessions in collective defense, overseas troop dispatch and TPP. It is like drinking poison to quench thirst. Thirdly, the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, which was redefined in 1997, had the clause on “the occurrence of possible accidents in the Southwest”. On top of that, American troops stationed in Okinawa and Naha also shows that the U.S.-Japan Alliance has a clear regional direction. However, despite all that, the United States retains its strategic independence and initiative to prevent it from being dragged into a regional war it has no choice. But, this time, facing domestic pressure, President Obama broke American strategic tradition to change from a strategy of ambiguity to a strategy of clarity, which revealed the core of U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and America’s military bottom line in the West Pacific. As a result, America lost its flexibility and room for maneuver. It is extremely unwise for a superpower to lose its strategic initiative and be kidnapped by Japan’s military built-up against China based on emperor power and militarism. This might well be viewed as the beginning of strategic failure. It is quite saddening to see a world hegemon falling so low. Going further, Obama and Abe said in the “Japan-U.S. Joint Statement” that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty covers the “Senkaku Islands”, a term illegal in the post-war system, which is a betrayal by the American administration for everyone who scarified their lives in the Allied forces in the Second World War.

America’s endorsement of Japan on “Diaoyu Island” and its adjacent waters will not bring much benefit for itself in TPP or other areas, instead, it will only embolden Japan to have new provocations on the disputed areas and drag the United States into ever deeper sea and air disputes. Disgracing its super power status by helping defend a defeated country in the Second World War will only make America many enemies and seriously undermine its interests in the West Pacific. It will delay America’s strategic tasks in other regions and see the pivot to Asia end in disaster.

IV. Russia’s regional offensive in Eastern Europe has forced the United States to rollback

（1）History of contest between the West and Russia on Ukraine. In history, the Don River, Ukraine and the Polish grasslands were strategic gateway for East-West contest and exchanges. In the process of overthrowing Yanukovich, Americans were controlling from behind while the Europeans fighting on the frontline. The United States and Europe had a battle of offense and defense against Russia on whether Ukraine should lean to West or East. From last year till now, the battle has entered into the third round. First round: a trade war centering on whether Ukraine should sign Association Agreement with the European Union. In the second round, United States and Europe instigated pro-Western forces in Ukraine to use violent street protest to overthrow the government of Yanukovich, only to be retaliated by Russia by taking Crimea with force. Although the United States and Europe took the initiative to get the new regime of Ukraine in its own hands, it lost a united Ukraine. Using the opportunity of “second orange revolution”, Russia took Crimea back amid the chaos and got the key to divide Ukraine even further. So Putin got the upper hand again in a disadvantageous situation. In the third round, Russia took military and political offensive in Eastern Ukraine and spin Eastern Ukraine off from the Western system.

（2）Future contest between the West and Russia on Ukraine. The fight between East and West is far from over. The political, economic and esp. geopolitical significance of Ukraine makes it impossible for the United States, Europe and Russia to quickly put an end to the contest, for no side can afford to lose it, particularly Russia. For several hundred years, Eastern Ukraine was the territory of Tsarist Russia and then the former Soviet Union, while independence is just a matter of the past 20 years after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. It has numerous ties with Russia economically, politically, culturally, religiously, and in other aspects. It offers no obvious geopolitical advantage for Ukraine to lean to the West. For example, if Ukraine leans completely to the West, the economic links between Russia and Ukraine will be cut off and the market will be squeezed. The Russian economy will be dealt a heavy blow. In particular, if Ukraine joined NATO, a military grouping, which always targets the former Soviet Union and now Russia, would be closer to Moscow in peaceful times and threaten the heart of Russia than the Napoleon troops in 1812 and the Fascist Germans in 1941. This is something the Russians will not tolerate. Similarly, the United States and Europe will not give up Ukraine, either. If the United States and Europe get frustrated in the wrestling and force Ukraine lean to Russia or choose neutrality, then the eastward expansion of the EU and NATO would have to stop at the Western border of Ukraine with no room for further expansion. This is something the United States and Europe cannot accept. Russia’s action in the Ukraine crisis shows that on the issue of preventing the eastward expansion of NATO, Russia has completed its defensive stage and acts on the offensive, and has assumed capabilities for doing that.

（3）Now Russia has more cards in its hands than the United States and Europe. But the more important question is whether each party dares to play every card it has. First of all, the targets for United States and Europe on the one hand and Russia on the other hand are different. The target for the Russian cards is the new regime of Ukraine. Since Russia does not have much constraint or fear, it has more cards to play without reservation, especially as it has the two powerful cards of not recognizing the legitimacy of the new Ukrainian regime and the capability of dividing Ukraine even further. If the elections do not go the way Russia wants or the results do not suit Russian interests, Russia will deny the legitimacy of the elections based on the illegitimacy of the new regime. When necessary, it will support pro-Russian forces in Eastern Ukraine to copy Crimea and start new referendums to “get out of Ukraine and get into Russia”. If the new regime chooses repression, it will offer excuses for Russia to use its troops already stationed on the border with Ukraine. This is something the West cannot ignore. On the contrary, the new regime in Ukraine has no card to play. It has to rely on the United States and Europe to play cards for it. The target for the U.S. and European cards is Russia. They have few cards in their hands and lots of misgivings and constraints. If they play it soft, it will not work on Russia. If they play it hard, they will suffer from equally heavy blows from Russia, which they cannot afford. So they are caught in a dilemma. Secondly, the United States and Europe cannot play the military card on Russia, yet Russia can play the military card on Ukraine, for Russia enjoys military advantage over Ukraine. Facing a big nuclear country with restored power that can destroy earth several times, the United States and Europe cannot play the military card. They dare not even use conventional weapons, for that is simply too dangerous for leaders like Putin. Furthermore, people in the United States and Europe will not allow their countries to go to war for other countries. As a result, Obama declared that it will not have military intervention in Ukraine. Different from the United States and Europe, Russia can get support from most people in Russia and even many Russians inside Ukraine when there is need for the military card. Thirdly, playing the economic card often leads to self-injury. Close economic ties between the EU and Russia constrains the EU’s ability to use economic sanctions. European countries have a lot of investment in Russia. Russia has sent the message that if the West pursues economic and financial sanctions against Russia, it will confiscate those investments, which will prove to be more losses on those countries. Besides, given that one quarter of its energy import comes from Russia, Europe cannot but be soft on Russia. So it is very difficult to have a unified position on the question of economic sanctions against Russia between the United States and EU and within EU states. Though the tones of sanctions are quite high, the real measures are quite mild. Even Russian officials think the Western sanctions are “not serious”. In the nutshell, the United States and Europe will continue to try to work with Russia to solve the Ukrainian issue through diplomatic means.

Taken as a whole, the Ukraine issue shows not only the geopolitical return of Russia but also that the real challenge for the U.S.-dominated West is not from China, but from Russia, which has similar mindset as the United States. In the third round of wrestling on Ukraine, Russia has shown obvious advantages militarily, politically, economically and geopolitically. Though the United States and Europe have some partial advantages, they have been generally dominated by Russia, and the future of Ukraine will move along a path favored by Russia. If the United States insists on turning to Asia-Pacific instead of rescuing Europe, Russia would continue to expand its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, the Black Sea and even the Mediterranean and show its tsarist power the second. Hence the dilemma for the United States: will it abandon its traditional sphere of influence in Europe to concentrate on China?

Therefore, the wish for the United States to return to Asia is one thing, its real ability to do that is another. China and the United States have changed the position of “defensive and offensive”. China is on the offensive while the United States is on the defensive. The marines and air forces of the United States are no longer the same as in the past. By the beginning of 2013, 288 ships had already been stationed in Asia-Pacific. To raise it to 60% will just mean another 20, which does not make much difference. We all know the high cost of siege. It will require 4 times of weapons and troops as well as financial resources for one party to siege the other. According to the Art of War by Sun Tsu, “in a situation of siege, enough resources at the front will mean inadequate resources at back; enough resources on the left will mean inadequate resources on the right. The besieging party will never have enough resources.” So the measure of siege is highly uneconomical and it may deplete American power. However, given the decision to cut military spending by US$1 trillion in ten years, America can hardly afford the unprecedented strategic siege. This is the huge gap between American strategic ambition and its real capabilities. It might take some time for strategists in the United States to realize that the gap between ideal and reality has always been huge. The U.S. pivot to Asia is doomed to peter out in 2014.

The key reason is that the United States has picked a wrong target. It has defined China as a strategic competitor or “hidden rival” several times. The United States has repeatedly had strategic misjudgments on China in history, because the Americans do not understand China. The U.S. strategic mistakes come from its misjudgments on China. Since American judgments on China are not based on the behavior of China in the past or at present; instead, based on its entrenched bias, believing that a rising power will necessarily challenge an established power. It also imposes the view on others. The differences between the political systems of the two countries have further enhanced the view. Powerful as it is, the United States cannot take China and Russia as its strategic rivals the same time. If the United States insists on a major strategic adjustment from the Atlantic to the Pacific, it will surely quicken its decline. It is not because China and America will have a large-scale war or China will defeat America, but because America will defeat itself. In the long run, “the pivot to Asia” will prove to be a major mistake in the strategic diplomatic readjustment during the reign of the Democratic Party.