摘要:
苏德超和张稆元在探讨自由意志的问题时,执着于西方主流学界有关自由与必然的二元对立架构,一方面将自由感与自由的存在分离开来,另一方面认为人性的必然逻辑会取消人们的自由和选择。这种把随意任性混同于随机偶然的研究路径不但会否定人们对自己的行为理应承担的自主责任,而且也会让自由本身沦为某种不可知不可解的虚幻之谜,从而陷入自败的泥潭。
关键词:
自由意志;人性逻辑;随机偶然;因果必然;二元对立架构
中图分类号:B01
文献标识码:A
文章编号:1000-5099(2018)04-0026-13
What is a Mystery of Free Will:
a Response to Professor SU Dechao and Ms. ZHANG Lvyuan
LIU Qingping1,2
(1.Fudan Institute of Advanced Study in Social Sciences, Fudan University, Shanghai, 200433, China;
2. School of Humanities, Wuhan College of Communication, Wuhan, Hubei, 430205, China)
Abstract:
In discussing the issue of free will, Su Dechao and Zhang Lvyuan are still attached to the dichotomy between freedom and necessity set up by the Western mainstream philosophy. On the one hand, they separate the sense of freedom from the factual existence of freedom; on the other hand, they think that the inevitable logic of human nature would cancel human freedom and choice. Such an approach of confusing freedom with chanciness will not only negate peoples responsibility for their own actions out of their free will, it will also make freedom a totally unknowable and illusory mystery in its self ̄defeat.
Key words:
free will; the logic of human nature; chanciness; necessity; dichotomy
一、我目前的核心见解
自由意志之谜在哲学上有多重要,这里或许就无需赘述了。所以,当我在探讨“善与正当(权益、正义)”关系的过程中,对这个问题顺带形成了某些新见解的时候,心里其实是没底的:这么简单的答案,两千年来那么多的西方顶级大师怎么会没想到呢?毕竟,我在这个领域也是半路出家的菜鸟,立论推理免不了硬伤软痕,说不定花了不少功夫闭门琢磨,不过是一厢情愿地误入歧途。也因此,我一直希望有学者指出我的错谬,以免越陷越深却不自知。基于这一心态,我在拜读了苏德超教授和张稆元女士的大作《自由意志、人性逻辑与主体责任——与刘清平教授商榷》(以下简称“苏张文”)[1],看到他们从专业视角揭示了我自己未能发现的种种模糊混乱后,一方面为自己当初的仓促草率感到惭愧(虽然导致这种仓促草率的主要是某些非学术的原因),另一方面又由衷地感谢他们认真严肃的学术批评(在目前学界热衷于自说自话乃至互相贊美的风气下,这一点尤为可贵),有助于我进一步反思批判自己的看法。……