EU Strategic Autonomy: Predicament and Way-out

In recent years， the European Union （EU） nurtured the concept of “strategic autonomy” and clearly expressed its ambition to act as an independent player globally. At present and in the near future， despite of discord and even quarrels within the EU， the basic consensus on maintaining strategic autonomy still remains. Therefore， the EU will not totally tilt towards the United States （US）. However， if the EU truly aims to achieve its goal of strategic autonomy， it needs to change its strategic mindset. Only by abandoning the pursuit of power politics and Cold War mentality and conforming to the trend of world peace and development can it play a more active role in the multipolar world.

The EU won’t totally tilt towards the US

Since the Cold War ended， the strategic mutual trust between European countries and the US was generally on decline. Although Europe is still under the nuclear umbrella of the US and the EU depends crucially on the US in terms of economy， trade， science and technology， it is a near zero-probability event that the EU “allies with the US to dominate”. The US-EU relations hit the bottom during Trump administration. Biden’s high-profile announcement of the “return to Europe” cheered many EU leaders up， but the US concrete actions indicated that Biden’s policy towards Europe still anchored to the “America First” position. After the US’ withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan and France’s fury over the sudden US-Australia nuclear submarine pact， European countries’ dream of substantial improvement of US-EU relations by the Biden Administration dashed. In this context， it is nearly impossible to build a closer “US-EU Bloc”.

First， the strategic mutual trust between the US and EU is obviously diminishing. After the end of the Cold War， both the US and the EU constantly showed the political will to strengthen transatlantic relations， but in fact they basically indulged in empty talk. France and Germany expressed opposition against the US’ decision to send troops to Iraq in 2003， thus deepening the rift between the two sides. France and Germany have been proven righteous and wise at that time， as the US’ war in Iraq caused the lingering turmoil in the Middle East and also triggered the “refugee crisis” in Europe in 2015. On this issue， France and Germany were unable to protect their interests from being jeopardized by the US’ military actions and the US cannot accept the open boycott by France and Germany. The incident thus severely damped the mutual trust between “Old Europe” and the US. Upon this backdrop， France and Germany are pushing for the EU’s strategic autonomy. As said by Josep Borrell， the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of the European Union， “EU wants to be the master of its own destiny”.

Second， the die-hard alliance between the US and the EU no longer exists. In the post-Cold War era， the world political and economic structure has gone through profound changes. Without formidable foreign enemies serving as the “strongest adhesive”， the bloc is on the trajectory of breaking up. The US has clung to anti-terrorism， defending against Russia and containing China as new ties to maintain transatlantic relations， but the results are barely satisfactory. It boils down to three reasons. First， the EU has different perceptions of the US’ “foreign enemies”. The EU is disinclined to give up the substantial benefits gained through pragmatic cooperation with Russia and China merely because of the US’ opposition. Second， in a multipolar world with economic globalization， it becomes less cost-effective for the US to bully as the “leader” of the West by throwing its weight internationally， so it has to go through strategic contraction. Third， the US cannot rid itself from unilateralism and hegemonism， placing it in a conflicted position with the EU that pursues “multilateralism”. In fact， 30 years after the end of the Cold War， the US is no longer able to provide the indispensable public goods for the EU， but still behaves as “the leader of the alliance”， which fundamentally damages the cohesion of the transatlantic alliance.

Finally， the EU refuses to be a vassal of the US. History has repeatedly proved that countries will have to pay the price for being a vassal. In any alliance， “hitchhikers” seem to gain short-term advantages， but in fact they enjoy the gratification at the cost of their long-term interests. The leader of the alliance will assert growing dominance， and the allies will be left no choice but to jeopardize their own long-term interests in order to save the vested interests and they will be gradually deprived of choices concerning the actions of the alliance. But in turn， the diminishing power of allies will be a drag on the alliance’s ability to act， and ultimately harm the interests of the leader of the alliance. In the EU’s A Global Strategy for European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy themed “Shared Vision， Common Action： A Stronger Europe” and released in June 2016， “strategic autonomy” is defined as “the ability to set its own priorities and make its own decisions on foreign and security policy”. This perception indicates that the EU is soberly aware that even within the transatlantic alliance， the inability to act independently will seriously dampen its own interests.

EU strategic autonomy can hardly make substantial progress

It serves the fundamental interests of EU members to improve their strategic autonomy through integration. However， they are reluctant to further give up sovereignty and assume heavier responsibilities in order to seek the strategic autonomy of the EU. This paradox runs through the European integration， and substantial changes can hardly take place in the short term.

First， as the “primary driver” of EU’s strategic autonomy， France is incapable of covering more costs than other countries. In early 1950s， six western European countries started working towards economic integration. Then French Prime Minister René Pleven was giving thought to the formation of a European Army run by supranational institutions to tackle the military threats posed by the Soviet Union and remedy the military deficiency of NATO in Europe. In May， 1952， the member states signed the Treaty of European Defense Community （EDC） in Paris. However， as the French troops were pinned down in Vietnam and its colonies in North Africa， Charles de Gaulle doubted the role of the “European Army”. Besides， the military threat posed by the Soviet Union was somewhat lifted. The French National Assembly ultimately refused to ratify the Treaty in 1954. This means that the EDC members completely “outsourced” their security and defense to the NATO， thus establishing the dominance of the transatlantic alliance in European defense in the following decades. In 1992， when the European Community was transformed into the European Union， and the “Common Foreign and Security Policy” was established as one of EU’s “three pillars”. But in essence， this pillar falls into the field of intergovernmental cooperation， imposing legal restrictions on EU’s supranational strategic autonomy.

Second， Germany doesn’t have zeal for the supranational European security and defense community. After the World War II， Germany， as a vanquished country， had to politically prioritize the “normalization” of the country. The country was neither poised nor able to try to play a “leading role” as France did on European security and defense issues. Though German Chancellor Angela Merkel was active in working with French President Emmanuel Macron in advancing the EU’s strategic autonomy， but the two countries didn’t see their differences on relevant issues decrease. At the Munich Security Conference in 2019， when Macron made remarks about the “brain death” of NATO， Merkel immediately expressed different opinions. In the process of European integration， Germany barely makes substantive response to such concepts put forward by France as advancing the strategic autonomy of Europe. Instead， Germany focuses more on maintaining the economic integration that delivers benefits to itself. In the post-Merkel era， Germany is so preoccupied with partisan rivalry and tons of other internal affairs that its energy falls short to contribute to France-advocated strategic autonomy of the EU.

Third， other EU members are even less motivated to advance the supranational strategic autonomy. The EU Global Strategy Document takes “strategic autonomy” as its core concept. Federica Mogherini， then High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy， stressed that in challenging times， a strong Union is one that thinks strategically， shares a vision and acts together. But this document was released at the time of the British referendum in 2016， when countries both inside and outside the EU， especially the United Kingdom （UK）， questioned the significance and future of the EU. In addition， EU’s new members in Central and Eastern Europe also lack confidence in the strategic autonomy advocated by the “Old Europe” led by France. Facing the potential threat from Russia， Poland， the Czech Republic and the Baltic states desire stronger US military presence in the region. It is not that these countries unconditionally trust the US， but rather that they place less trust in France and Germany’s willingness and capacity to protect Europe.

The root cause of the predicament facing EU’s strategic autonomy

The “EU’s Global Strategy Document” mentions “autonomy” for nine times. Its essence is to improve the EU’s ability to identify priorities and make decisions on foreign and security policy， as well as the institutional， political and material resources needed to cooperate with third parties or independently implement these matters when necessary. Obviously， the focus of EU’s desired autonomy is foreign and security policy and the priority is common defense.

In recent years， under the cloud of the “Brexit”， the Trump Administration’s “America First” policy and the COVID-19 pandemic， EU’s strategic autonomy failed to make breakthroughs. The root cause of this strategic predicament is that in the era of peace and development， the EU attempts to unite to form “first-class” strength so as to cooperate with the US on an equal footing and jointly exercise “dominance” on the international arena based on the collective interests of western bloc. The intention of this strategy is neither practical nor appropriate.

First， the EU’s strategic autonomy is a concept with the undertones of power politics， but the EU obviously lacks the hard power to realize such “autonomy”. It will remain reality for a long period to come that NATO “contracts” the defense in Europe and that on the diplomatic front， the EU members still cannot actually “speak with one voice”. More importantly， all being export-oriented economies， European countries are highly dependent on the world economy. According to statistics， Germany’s dependence on foreign trade （that is， the ratio of total import and export volume to GDP） in 2019 was as high as 70.8%， far exceeding that of China and the US in the same period. Even taking into consideration of the amount of free trade within the EU， such degree of dependence is still the highest among major economies. Germany is the locomotive of the EU economy， but still not able to develop its economy in isolation from the US and China. Merkel and other wise German politicians were firmly committed to the ideal of world peace and development， because power politics featured by rivalry and exclusiveness just won’t serve their national interests. This also represents the common strategic demand of EU countries.

Second， through strategic autonomy， the EU wants to gain a more equal standing with the US in the transatlantic alliance， but this conception is not practically feasible for three reasons. First， the EU is only partly integrated. Second， the US places limited trust in and respect for the EU. In September， 2021， the diplomatic row between the AUKUS and France around the purchase contract of nuclear submarines dragged the French-US relationship once down to the lowest point since the Iraq War in 2003. The EU expressed its support for France by merely demanding clarification from the US over the situation. The row was over， but it highlights how unrealistic and undeliverable the EU’s strategic autonomy is.

Third， the EU attempts to display its strategic autonomy by “showing its teeth”， but the Union doesn’t have enough weight to grab the attention of the US. In recent years， the US has frequently sent warships to the South China Sea to “flex its muscles”. France， Germany and other countries have recently joined in. In September 2021， the EU issued the document titled EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. France and Germany engaged in the South China Sea to negatively impacted the China-EU relations， but they weren’t able to alter the fact that the AUKUS， an alliance led by the US， “stole” France’s nuclear submarine deal. This comparison reveals the paradox of EU’s actions.

What is the way-out of EU’s strategic autonomy？

For the EU， “strategic autonomy” is not only a principled position， but also an exploration and even trial-and-error process. Only by committing to the ideal of peace and development can EU’s strategic autonomy find a way out of the current predicament.

On the one hand， the EU needs rid itself from the “Spirit of the Crusader”. The so-called “Cold War mentality” is merely a modern version of the “Spirit of the Crusader”. Therefore， it will still be a process of trials and turbulence for European countries to heartedly accept the basic norms of a new type of international relations， such as mutual respect， fairness and justice and win-win cooperation. In today’s world， peace and development are the overriding trend. Only by discarding the inappropriate “Spirit of the Crusader” can EU’s strategic autonomy gradually get out of the predicament and rise above empty talk.

On the other hand， the EU should remain committed to its self-positioning of a supporter of multilateralism and peace， and give up the illusion of continuing to dominate the world by strengthening the transatlantic alliance. EU’s nature and feature determine that it should be the promoter of world peace and multilateralism. After the end of the Cold War， some scholars once defined the EU as a “normative power” or “civil power” as opposed to the American hegemonism. In 2011， when the UK and France launched air strikes against Libya， they unveiled the “power” side of the EU members. The “EU’s Global Strategy Document” released in 2016 brought into focus the strategic autonomy in the foreign and security policy， indicating that what agitated the EU most was its lack of hard power diplomacy and defense. When Ursula von der Leyen took office as the President of the European Commission at the end of 2019， she proposed to reshape the Commission into a “geopolitical commission” to advance strategic autonomy and prevent Europe from losing its geopolitical clout. In the meantime， the Commission extended the concept of security to such fields as industrial strategy， green strategy and digital strategy， revealing EU’s willingness to significantly expand the fields of strategic “autonomy”. Traces of the “Spirit of Crusader” remain visible in EU’s strategic concept in these fields， but the Union goes beyond the narrow strategic concept with “building a powerful military” as the core， which can be gauged as a progress if judging from the perspective of peace and development. EU’s strategic autonomy aims to “promote the common interests of citizens and uphold values and principles”. To achieve this end in the multipolar era， the EU should respect the rights of other countries to safeguard their people’s interests and their own values and principles and be soberly aware that any attempt to bully the weak through alliances can only harm others without benefiting themselves.

An EU that adheres to the concept of peace and development can not only benefit Europe， but also the world. Only by abandoning the conventional mindset of seeking hegemony through alliance can EU’s strategic autonomy make substantial progress in the future and the EU play a more constructive role in the international arena.

Tian Dewen is Deputy Director and Researcher of the Institute of European Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences