Inclusive or Exclusive?

By Ma Miaomiao

In an attempt to address the lack of strategic clarity on the United States’ overall policy in the Indo-Pacific region， President Joe Biden’s administration released a new strategy on February 11. Then， on May 23， Biden launched an economic initiative， the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity （IPEF）.

Developing a successful strategy for the IndoPacific is critical for the U.S. to secure its vital national interests in the region， reads an article on The Diplomat. This， as Ryan Hass， a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution， asserts， means that Washington “needs an Asia strategy for dealing with China， rather than a China strategy for Asia.”

During a regional forum held in Japan in May， former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad cautioned that the IPEF was formulated with the intention of isolating China and will not benefit regional economic growth.

How can we evaluate the strategic consequences of the Indo-Pacific Strategy on the Asia-Pacific region， the world’s most vibrant and promising economic powerhouse that has enjoyed its own 40-year long peace and rapid growth？ How will the IPEF affect regional economic integration， which is already progressing through institutions such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations （ASEAN）， Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation （APEC） and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership（RCEP）？ How can we ensure U.S. competition with China under the strategy will be managed responsibly？ These topics were discussed by a panel at the 10th World Peace Forum. The highlevel seminar on international security， themed Preserving International Stability： Commonality， Comprehensiveness and Cooperation， was hosted by Tsinghua University in Beijing on July 2-4.

In the region， generally， no single power is happy with the present situation， with many believing they are reacting defensively to the actions of others， said Shivshankar Menon， former national security adviser of India. “So we have， in Asia today， [many] powers who display the classic features of a series of security dilemmas，” he added.

More countries are forced into the strategic competition between major powers， according to Zhou Fangyin， Dean of the School of International Relations at Guangdong University of Foreign Studies. It is even more difficult for most East Asian countries to stay out of the way， and their attempts to maintain a relatively balanced diplomacy between China and the U.S. are becoming more difficult to achieve than in the past， he added.

Moon Chung-in， a former special advisor for foreign affairs and national security to the president of the Republic of Korea （ROK）， shared at the panel discussion his concerns. In his eyes， there is a contradiction between collective security and defense in the Indo-Pacific Strategy. The strategy seems to emphasize the logic of a collective defense system that assumes common enemies and threats， he said， adding “such a strategy orientation is bound to undermine the mandate of a common security while destabilizing overall security architecture in the region.”

Asia is different from Europe. Instead of a polarized security order with a military alliance like NATO， there are several bilateral alliance commitments in Asia， but many more partnerships， said Menon， adding that he believes partnerships differ from alliances in that partnerships accommodate common interest， but also divergent approaches.

For instance， India is a member of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with the U.S.， Japan and Australia （commonly referred to as the QUAD）， “but that doesn’t mean India endorses every stance on every issue that our partners have，” he said.

The current modality and security cooperation embodied in the IndoPacific Strategy is a kind of “small groupism，” as advanced by the trilateral security alliance of the U.S.， the UK and Australia （or AUKUS）， the QUAD and several trilateral dialogues including the one among Japan， the ROK and the U.S.， Moon told the forum. “Such security cooperation can destabilize an overall security architecture by creating what I call the ‘spaghetti bowl effect’（the increasing number of security cooperation mechanisms within a region actually slows down its progress）. They can really force some kinds of chaos and disorder，” he noted.

The U.S. claims that the IPEF is not an exclusive economic bloc， but China perceives it differently. If， in real practice， the framework functions as an exclusive one， it will significantly impair the institutional foundation of free trade and open regionalism， Moon said.

According to Zhou， the U.S. is endeavoring to leverage its strength in security and in international discourse and rule-making to influence the regional economic sphere and push the regional environment in a direction unfavorable to China.

For decades， China’s prosperity and rapid economic development have been the engine of growth in East Asia. Most East Asian countries， including friends and allies of the U.S.， trade more with China than with the U.S. Moreover， China is capable of raising much more money than the U.S. to fund development in the IndoPacific region， said former U.S. Ambassador to China J. Stapleton Roy at another panel discussion during the forum.

Ong Keng Yong， a Singaporean diplomat who served as secretary general of ASEAN between 2003 and 2007， believes the strategy does at least demonstrate some economic faith in the Asia-Pacific region， as the U.S. economy needs the region， a growth-driver， to make itself more economically competitive worldwide.

The strategy is based on the premise of cooperation among like-minded countries which share common values and interests. However， this kind of cooperation is insufficient to unite the region.“The U.S. should be willing to engage in dialogue and even cooperation with non-like-minded countries，” Moon said. “Otherwise， the dichotomy of like-minded versus non-like-minded countries can easily precipitate the advance of a new cold war division into hostile blocs，” he added.

Comparing the weight the Chinese economy holds within the RCEP to the weight of the U.S. economy in IPEF “suggests that this is a race， but the Chinese economic growth is going to win，” said Bob Carr， former Foreign Minister of Australia， who attended the forum online. BR