On the U.S. Post-Cold War Non-proliferation Policy

By Liu Zikui



On the U.S. Post-Cold War Non-proliferation Policy

By Liu Zikui

Since the end of the Cold War, the importance of non-proliferation of WMD has been enhanced constantly in the U.S. national security strategy and on the agenda of the U.S. foreign policy, and non-proliferation has gradually become one of its most important policy objectives and focus of attention. The international academic circles have conducted quite a few studies in this connection. Generally speaking, the scholars have either studied the relations between non-proliferation and counter-proliferation,1or tried to explore the justifiability of counter-proliferation,2or discussed whether proliferation could be prevented,3or explored the countermeasures against proliferation.4or reconsidered the U.S. nonproliferation strategy while noticing the evolution and characteristics of the U.S. post-Cold War non-proliferation policy. However, the scholars often hold contradictory views, or maintain that the U.S. non-proliferation strategy has no effect or has collapsed, or has achieved a great success.5As for what caused proliferation after the Cold War, scholars with traditional views emphasize external driving factors, especially the role of “security dilemma”, however the revisionist scholars like Gregory J. Rattray and William Kincade emphasize internal factors including reputation, regime types and economic conditions etc, which they believe have played the same important role in WMD proliferation.6Obviously, both of the traditional views and revisionist views have neglected the influence of the U.S. policy, especially its negative influences.

This paper studies the U.S. post-Cold War non-proliferation policies and measures, discusses its characteristics and consequences and explores the causes that have led to the current WMD proliferation situation.

I. The U.S. Post--Cold War Non-proliferation Policies and Measures.

Since the end of WWII, non-proliferation of WMD has become an international political issue and an important theme of the international relations during the Cold War period. The end of the Cold War did not reduce states dependence on the powerful WMD. On the contrary, every nuclear threshold country and some non-state actors have raced to grasp all kinds of WMD. WMD proliferation has become the most serious potential threat to global security and stability, which will not only weaken the international arms control legal systems and damage the criteria of international law about the use of these weapons, erode the efforts to strengthen international non-proliferation regime and criteria, but also intensify the discussion on the U.S. national interests. At the same time, since “the rogue states” want to have dominant position in their regions and consider the WMD as the key factor for the maintenance of their regimes, deterrence to their regional rivals, challenge to the U.S. hegemony and restriction to the U.S. use of military forces. Once a hostile country or a potential hostile country holds WMD, the cost for the U.S. to carry out intervention will increase significantly. The room for the U.S. maneuver in the increasingly mobile international environment will become smaller. Therefore, non-proliferation of WMD, especially non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, has gradually become one of the most important policy objectives in the U.S. diplomacy, military and national security strategy and a top priority issue of the U.S. Government. In order to prevent proliferation, the U.S. Government has taken some policies and measures in politics, economy, military and diplomacy.

First, restructure or establish new non-proliferation institutions and strengthen coordination and rationalize the relationship.

Many departments and institutions of the U.S. Government have taken part in the non-proliferation affairs,including many offices in the White House.The successive U.S. administrations have reformed and adjusted the non-proliferation institutions since the end of the Cold War.

To reorganize and establish new non-proliferation institutions are important initiatives of the U.S Administrations’ non-proliferation efforts. Since November 1997by the Defense Capability Initiative, the U.S. Government established Defense Threat Reduction Agency, which was reorganized by Defense Special Weapons Agency, On-Site Inspection Agency and Defense Technology Security Administration, and should regularly submit reports on WMD proliferation and propose responsive initiatives. The most striking institutional adjustment is to incorporate the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) into the State Department in April 1999.After the revocation of ACDA, arms control and non-proliferation was incorporated into the daily routine of the State Department and enhanced the importance of non-proliferation in the U.S. foreign policy and national security strategy and the capability of the Department of State to deal with the challenge of WMD proliferation. Non-proliferation has become a top priority of the U.S. foreign policy.

To strengthen coordination and cooperation among the relevant non-proliferation institutions, the U.S. Government has decided to establish an inter-department coordination institution under the guidance of the National Security Committee and the White House. At the national level, the National Security Committee is responsible to develop non-proliferation guidelines and establishes counter-proliferation technical coordination committee, whose major task is to formulate key policies, strategies, research and development and logistic objectives, and is responsible for coordinating the non-proliferation efforts among government departments. At the department level, the Clinton Administration established the Counter-proliferation Program Review Committee in 1994, which is responsible for reviewing all non-proliferation activities and programs. and is authorized to formulate and implement inter-department recommendations for actions and plans.7In order to deal with the increasingly serious proliferation of biological and chemical weapons, the United States established inter-department non-proliferation round-table conferences in different fields in early 1990s. In 1996, it set up the center of prevention of biological and chemical weapons proliferation. As the proliferation of biological and chemical weapons exacerbated, President Clinton announced to establish Task Forces to prevent proliferation of biological and chemical weapons.8In the field of prevention of missile proliferation, the U.S. Government established missile technology export control working group, which coordinates the efforts of different departments on prevention of missile proliferation.9Thus, the U.S. Government established a complete system in different areas and at different levels to coordinate the non-proliferation efforts of all departments.

Second, improve non-proliferation laws, regulations and strengthen law enforcement, penalty and sanctions.

In the end of 1991, the U.S. Congress adopted the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act, which required the United States. to provide aid to help Russia and the newly independent countries store and remove nuclear warheads, however, it is quickly expanded to prevent the proliferation of biological and chemical weapons and missiles. During the Iran-Iraq War, in order to prevent the further proliferation and use of biological and chemical weapons,The United States adopted the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991, which is the most important law of the U.S. prevention of biological and chemical weapons proliferation. This act requires the U.S. Government to impose sanctions against those countries that use chemical or biological weapons in violation of the international law. Since 1992, several similar Acts on the Iran-Iraq arms proliferation were passed. The Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 requires the U.S. Government to impose sanctions against those countries that help or instigate other countries to obtain nuclear weapons or those countries (non-state actors) that obtain or explode nuclear explosive devices. In 2000, the U.S. Congress passed the Iran Non-proliferation Act of 2000 and Iran-Iraq Arms Non-proliferation Act (Amendment), which stipulate that the U.S. will impose sanctions against any country that help Iran get WMD. In 2005, the U.S. passed Iran, Syria Non-proliferation Act and Syria was also included into the non-proliferation scope. In 2006, the U.S. Congress listed the DPRK as a target of this Non-proliferation Act. In order to prevent missile proliferation, the U.S. passed the Missile Sanction Law in 2000. Through the above series of acts and laws, the United States has established a complete non-proliferation legal system.

Economic penalty or sanction is a basic tool or important means of non-proliferation. In order to impose non-proliferation sanctions effectively, the U.S. Government has actively used relevant domestic non-proliferation laws and the UN and other international organizations. From the Clinton Administration to the Obama Administration, the United States has used more and more sanctions.From years 2005 to 2007, the U.S. imposed financial sanctions against 35 entities in Syria, the DPRK and Iran-- for the involvement in proliferation of WMD,10and made it more difficult for them to obtain the necessary funds, technologies and relevant materials to develop WMD and delayed the countries concerned to develop -nuclear weapons and won time for the U.S. and the international community to take responsive measures.

Third, strengthen international cooperation and promote the international community to implement non-proliferation according to the U.S. standards and principles.

To be successful, non-proliferation needs international cooperation because in the time of globalization, no single country is able to realize the objective of non-proliferation. Cooperation is possible since proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons constitutes real threat virtually to every country.

Different from the bilateral cooperation to prevent proliferation by the United States and the Soviet Union, since the end of the Cold War, the United States has mainly strengthened international cooperation, especially multilateral cooperation in the framework of international regime, and frequently made recommendations to the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Australia Group, Missile Technology Control Regime and Wassenaar Arrangement and required member countries to expand control lists and impose control on dual use goods, relevant information and technologies, and tried its best to persuade other member countries to coordinate with MTCR, and is committed to introducing multilateral control lists and to persuading the MTCR member countries to reach an agreement in principle and put into effect its Annex of equipments and technologies.11The U.S. has re-enacted and updated the dual use export control lists in the Annex of Nuclear Suppliers Group and MTCR and made them consistent with the U.S. commercial control lists. Up to 2005, the U.S. had included a lot of biological and chemical weapons and small arms into multilateral control lists and got the support of the above four international organizations. Since 1994, the “no undercutting” rule has been expanded to Australia Group, Nuclear Suppliers Group and MTCR.12Thus, the potential buyer will not have any chance to obtain an export license from another member state in the four supplier groups.

The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are the major foundations of the international non-proliferation regime. With the efforts of the international community including the United States., the NPT is extended indefinitely. More and more countries have joined the treaty.13Since the 9·11 event, IAEA has not only formulated the norms on radioactive substances and insurance operation and counter-nuclear terrorism action plan, but also developed nuclear security program for a period of 4 years.

As the most important intergovernmental organization, the United Nations is used as the most important platform to promote multilateral non-proliferation cooperation. In April 2004, the UN Security Council adopted the U.S. drafted Resolution 1540 and required every member to implement export control on the export, transit, transfer and re-export of WMD, build end user control system, impose criminal or civil penalties against those individuals or entities that violate export control laws so as to prevent non-state actors from obtaining these items, and report to the UN about the implementation of the Resolution 1540. Since taking office, President Obama has strengthened cooperation with the UN in this aspect.

To cooperate with NATO and friendly countries is an important part of the U.S. non-proliferation policy. Soon after the end of the Cold War, NATO was not active on non-proliferation. The Brussels NATO Summit in January 1994 emphasized that NATO must combine political and military capabilities to prevent proliferation and use of WMD. After 9/11, the U.S. cooperation with NATO became closer. In December 2003, the United States and NATO established new non-proliferation responsive mechanisms, and in November 2007, established joint defense center against biological weapons, chemical weapons, radioactive substances and nuclear weapons, strengthened non-proliferation education and training.

According to the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act in 1993, the United States and Russia had cooperated to dismantle the WMD in the territory of the former Soviet Republics and strengthen the security of related technologies and materials. By November 1996, Kazakhstan, Byelorussia and Ukraine had dismantled all of the ballistic missiles in their territory and transported the removed nuclear war heads to Russia for dismantle. All the launch devices in the three countries had also been destroyed.14By October 2004, Russia had dismantled 3172 nuclear warheads. In April 2008, Russia dismantled the last group of SS-24 intercontinental ballistic missiles15. These actions have not only effectively prevented the WMD in the territories of the former Soviet Union from further proliferation but also prevented other countries from developing WMD.

The above U.S. actions are not only conducive to non-proliferation, but also have consolidated and expanded the U.S. hegemony and influence in international non-proliferation regime.

Fourth, build reliable deterrence in offensive and defensive capabilities combined with pre-emptive strike.

The United States maintains that reliable deterrence will make the cost for an attacker to take an action higher than take no action and so it is such deterrence that prevents it from taking any action. In order to prevent WMD proliferation, the United States has to build and carry out effective deterrence.16

Strategic deterrence is the base of the U.S. deterrent forces. After the Cold War, the United States has tried to transform the old triad formed by the land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and strategic bombers to the new triad of strategic nuclear forces formed by offensive nuclear and conventional forces, active and passive defensive systems and a flexible responsive infrastructure. The 9/11 attacks made the George W. Bush Administration propose to build the new triad of deterrent forces in the Nuclear Posture Review Report in 2002 so as to make more flexible nuclear or non-nuclear responses in faceof threats.17The Obama Administration verbally states that the U.S. would devalue the role of nuclear weapons in the U.S. national strategic security. However he continues to strengthen offensive and defensive deterrent forces. The U.S. Government has announced the 10-yearstrategic program for replacement warheads so as to extend the life of nuclear weapons, making sure the reduction of the strategic nuclear weapons will non-harm its nuclear deterrence.18In addition, the U.S. has developed new strategic submarines so as to replace the current Ohio-class strategic submarines. Even with the Ohio-class submarines on active duty, it still has the capability to destroy major cities in Russia and China.19

In tactical deterrence, the United States has made dramatic efforts to develop new-type and small-sized nuclear bombs which can be used in battle-field and believedthat the WMD facilities and military headquarters of the terrorists and the so-called rogue states are deeply buried underground and the conventional weapons can hardly effectively destroy them so it needs to develop powerful bunk buster with strong penetration. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 removed the legal barrier for developing bank busters. The Obama Administration continues this development and requests to extend the life of the B-61 nuclear warheads and ensures that the B-61 warheads will be put into mass production in 2017.20

While developing nuclear deterrent after the Cold War, the United States has attached great importance to the development of offensive and defensive conventional forces. To develop and deploy missile defense systems have become an important U.S. non-proliferation policy after the Cold War. On June 13, 2002, the U.S. officially withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. On December 17, President George W. Bush ordered to deploy the national missile defense system. Currently, it has finished the most challenging anti-missile tests and believes that the capability to carry out global fast strikes to any targets bears great deterrent value and fighting effect.21Therefore, while deploying the missile defense system, it has actively developed and deployed the prompt global strike system, which is considered a new deterrent, and conducive to filling the vacancy left by the reduction of strategic nuclear arsenal and providing more choices for the U.S. to deal with international crisis.

Consistent with building nuclear and conventional deterrence, the United States has actively carried out pre-emptive non-proliferation.The 9/11 attacks changed the direction of the U.S. non-proliferation policy. In his speech in January and June 2002, President George W. Bush announced that in order to avoid any strike like the 9/11, the United States would carry out pre-emptive strikes against the so-called the axis of evil that support terrorists and proliferate WMD.

The National Strategy to Combat WMD Destruction further emphasizes the concept of pre-emption and demands to combine anti-proliferation and pre-emption.22Now, pre-emption has become the U.S. national security strategy and military strategy and also the basic guideline of the anti-proliferation policy. The Obama Administration has repeatedly expressed that he will continue the pre-emption strategy and prevent WMD proliferation and reserves the necessary instruments including the pre-emptive military strike.

Fifth, the model of non-proliferation triad of anti-proliferation, non-proliferation and consequence management has been gradually improved and at last formed.

Traditionally, in order to prevent WMD proliferation, the United States has carried out non-proliferation policy by using diplomatic and economic means such as sanctions and export controls. Since the end of the Cold War, the WMD proliferation has exacerbated especially Iraq’s nuclear weapons program was exposed, which made the U.S. and other Western leaders understand the extreme threats of proliferation of nuclear weapons to radical and unfriendly countries. Therefore, the United States proposed and implemented in December 1993 the Counter-proliferation Initiative to develop new military capabilities to deal with new threats and to combine prevention and protection. This strategy provides that the Department of Defense use all measures including diplomacy, arms control, export control, intelligence collection and analysis to counter proliferation so as to protect the U.S. armed forces and interests. In December 2002, the George W. Bush Administration released the National Strategy to Combat WMD, which combine counter-proliferation, non-proliferation and consequence management.23Thus, U.S. model of prevention of WMD proliferation including the triad of non-proliferation, counter-proliferation and consequences management finally established.

The U.S. Department of Defense has established 3 responsive teams to deal with WMD consequence management and carried out exercises. In order to more vigorously deal with consequence of the use of biological and chemical weapons, the DoD has formulated individual and collective protection programs, decontamination programs and medical training programs.

II. The Main Features of the U.S. Non-Proliferation After the End of the Cold War.

The U.S. non-proliferation policy since the end of the Cold War has the following features:

The first is clear-cut selection. The so-called selective non-proliferation is that to any new country that prepares to develop WMD, the United States applies different polices, i.e. preventing those countries that support international terrorism or use military forces against their neighbors from developing WMD while accepting those to obtain deterrent forces just to seek protection from other’s threats. The theoretic base of the U.S. post-Cold War selective non-proliferation policy is the so-called “democratic peace theory”. Many U.S. scholars and government officials divide proliferation into good and bad proliferation and stand for preventing bad proliferation and allowing good proliferation. Therefore, the United States maintains that counter proliferation is unnecessarily targeted at all those new seekers to develop WMD and only those hostile countries.

In 2004, the report submitted by the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Energy to the Congress declares that the proliferation in the “rogue states” has nothing to do with the U.S. nuclear programs. It is only power and reputation that drive them to develop nuclear weapons.24Some scholars also maintain that there is no direct linkage between the U.S. nuclear policy and the nuclear program in Iran or the DPRK. If there is any linkage, the two would be relieved if giving up the program.

Selective non-proliferation is also reflected in that the United States is sympathetic to or even helps its allies and the so-called democratic countries develop nuclear programs. The U.S. has tried its best to promote Nuclear Suppliers Group to carry out nuclear technological cooperation with India under the condition that India implements all security measures. The reason is that India and Pakistan are not hostile and the possibility of military confrontation with them is very low. The United States is very sympathetic to a nuclear Israel. Although the U.S. supports to develop a nuclear free zone in the Middle East in the 2010 NPT Review Conference, but giving the precondition that for realizing this goal, Israel and its neighbors should reach a comprehensive peace agreement. Moreover, the U.S. maintains that Iran must disarm first and Iran’s security concerns come second and the same practice also applies to the DPRK.

The high selection of the U.S. non-proliferation policy shows that the core of the U.S. non-proliferation policy is against threat. Of course, this does not deny that it has pursued non-proliferation.

The second is the clear asymmetry in the cooperation between the United States and the international community.

The asymmetry firstly reflects that the U.S. has the dominating power in developing international non-proliferation agenda and norms. Since the end of the Cold War, most international non-proliferation activities, programs and initiatives, either multilateral, bilateral or unilateral, are proposed and decided by the United States. These measures are conducive to the maintenance of the U.S. free action, leadership and military superiority. From the Clinton counter-proliferation initiative to the junior Bush proliferation security initiative and to the Obama nuclear free world, generally, the international community has accepted and complied with the U.S. initiated non-proliferation agenda and the norms of the international non-proliferation regimes and policies.

The asymmetry of the U.S. cooperation with international community is also reflected in the U.S. free selection of non-proliferation platforms, which has both destructive and constructive effects. On destructive side, it has ignored many bilateral and multilateral non-proliferation mechanisms since the end of the Cold War. As it is known to all, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty is a corner stone of the international non-proliferation regime, however the U.S. Congress refused to ratify the treaty in October 1999, and currently there is no sign that it will do so. Another example, the Additional Protocol of the Biological Weapons Convention is the important guarantee for the ban of biological weapons, however the U.S. is firmly opposed to it under the pretext that it threatens the effectiveness of the defense plan of a biological warfare, weakens the U.S. and other Western countries’ export control programs, threatens operational business, intellectual property rights and there are no means in place to verify the implementation at a reasonable cost.25Despite the ABM Treaty, the Clinton Administration started deployment of missile defense system. The junior Bush Administration simply declared withdrewal from the ABM Treaty. As for the multilateral mechanisms such as the UN, if it can be used, all right, otherwise, will be bypassed and even ignored, for example, the U.S. launched Iraq war in 2003.

From the constructive angle, since the end of the Cold War, the United States has constantly strengthened some non-proliferation mechanisms and established new non-proliferation mechanisms, bilateral or multilateral, such as Cooperative Threat Reduction Initiative, Container Security Initiative, Non-proliferation Security Initiative, Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, G-8 Global Partnership against the Proliferation of WMD. These mechanisms or actions have played important roles in the U.S. non-proliferation policy and progress.

The last is to shift from over-emphasis on pre-emption to flexible use of smart power.

After the end of the Cold War, some U.S. scholars and strategists begin reflecting and recommending to the U.S. Government to correctly use “smart power”, which will make the U.S. “a smarter power”.26Major U.S. leaders including President Obama have all stated that the U.S. Government must resort to smart power, unite all forces that can by united, consolidate old alliances, build new alliances and open a new situation. In his speech delivered in the UN General Assembly in September 2009, President Obama said that the United States would like to open a new era by engaging the world through words and deeds. State Secretary Hillary explained that smart power is the symbol of the Obama Administration’s foreign strategy and that the U.S. foreign policy must be compatible with the global realities and the differences with the former administrations are the difference in philosophy.27

President Obama has expressed that the U.S. Government will change the past unpopular practice and will strengthen multilateral or bilateral consultations with its allies and Russia, and the U.S. Government also hopes to change its policy to the “rogue states”. President Obama says that he supports to realize the goal of a nuclear free Korean Peninsula through diplomatic efforts; as for Iran, the U.S. should pursue bold and direct high level diplomacy with harsh sanctions but without any pre-conditions.28He has declared to join the 6-country talks on Iran nuclear issue, promised that the United States. will never have a war with the Islamic world and would build partnership with it. At the non-proliferation conference held by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in April 2009, Undersecretary of State James B. Steinberg stated that diplomacy must play a central role in solving the DPRK and the Iran nuclear issues.29

The concept of smart power requests combination of soft power and hard power and flexible use of power. For example, in order to better and quicker carry out military strikes, the Quadrennial Defense Review Report in 2010 develops the sea-air battle concept, strengthens its prompt global strike system which can penetrate air defense systems and hit targets thousands miles away. The United States will deploy missile defense system without any restriction in spite of Russia firm opposition.

III. The Consequences of the U.S. Post-Cold War Non-Proliferation and its Causes

The non-proliferation after the Cold War has made dramatic achievements. In nuclear non-proliferation, South Africa abolishes its nuclear weapons and joins the NPT as a non-nuclear state. Byelorussia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan have transferred their nuclear weapons to Russia and given up the rights to develop nuclear weapons in the future. Besides, Argentina, Brazil, Sweden and South Korea have also given up their efforts to develop nuclear weapons and joined the NPT as non-nuclear states. All NPT state parties agreed in 1995 to extend the NPT indefinitely. Entering 21stcentury, Libya has given up its secret nuclear weapon program under the threat of the U.S. military strike. It is also important that the U.S.-Russia new START limits the two countries nuclear warheads to 1550. In non-proliferation of missiles, Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Iraq and some other countries have either given up missile development or suffered major setbacks in the development.30In non-proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, the threat reduction program of biological weapons between the United States and the former Soviet Republics goes smoothly and has expanded to countries and regions in South Asia, South East Asia and Africa. The international community adopted the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997. Up to January 2010, 188 countries joined the Convention.

After more than 20 years efforts of non-proliferation, it seems that WMD proliferation is getting more serious. More countries have nuclear weapons, more countries have missiles and more countries have the technologies and capability to develop missiles, biological and chemical weapons. During the Cold War, there were only 5 nuclear states, but more are added to the list in the post-Cold War. At the same time, the proliferation of biological and chemical weapons gets more serious and the relevant conventions are poorly implemented. In 1993, 20 countries had chemical weapons and a dozen countries had biological weapons.31By 2008, the number of countries that could develop chemical weapons has increased and abolition of chemical weapons met serious challenges. Just due to the U.S. opposition, the international community is unable to agree to the provisions for verification and implementation needed by the Biological Weapon Convention. The situation of missile and its technology proliferation is also worrisome. In 1990, 16 countries had ballistic missiles while in 2009, more than 20 countries had.32

Although the anarchy of the international community is not conducive to WMD non-proliferation, as the sole superpower, the U.S. non-proliferation policy and measures have undeniable relations with the intensified WMD proliferation since the Cold War.

First, the selective non-proliferation policy has exacerbated proliferation.

Theoretically, while taking flexible non-proliferation measures, the selective non-proliferation has weakened the international non-proliferation regime. If the international non-proliferation regime can accept friendly or non-aggressive countries to develop or acquire WMD, then, how to prevent proliferation? What will happen? Theoretic weakness will inevitably lead to embarrassment in reality.

Practically, selective non-proliferation basically frees the so called Western democratic countries to develop or acquire WMD from international community’s restriction, so all other countries have every reason to worry about their national security and take measures to strengthen it. The U.S. selective non-proliferation policy actually has encouraged WMD proliferation in the so called Western democratic countries, India and Pakistan are good cases to follow, but will inevitably invite reasonable doubts from other countries and further stimulate them to develop WMD. So, the DPRK and Iran take hard stance to the UN resolutions.

Second, continue to use deterrence as the important content of its national security strategy and deterrence itself has become an instrument of non-proliferation, which has further stimulated proliferation

During the Cold War, the successive U.S. presidents heavily relied on deterrence especially nuclear deterrence. The successful nuclear deterrence in the past and at present has ensured the non-use of nuclear weapons in reality so that this policy is always preserved. Therefore, to maintain and increase the reliability and effectiveness of the U.S. deterrence, every U.S. president refuses to undertake non-first use of nuclear weapons. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Government still considers deterrence, especially nuclear deterrence, to be the core factor of its military strategy and has gradually used deterrence as an instrument for non-proliferation.

The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review Report in 1994 declared that it was legal to use nuclear weapons to counter attack WMD or even chemical weapons attacks by non-nuclear weapon states.33In 1997, President Clinton ordered to modify the U.S. nuclear strategy and determined that the task of the U.S. nuclear force is not to fight a protracted nuclear war but to prevent nuclear attacks, which theoretically empowers the role of nuclear weapons in non-proliferation.34

The role of the nuclear weapons is further emphasized in the U.S. official documents. For example, the National Strategy to Combat WMD in 2002 and the 17thPresident National Security Directive state that the U.S. would reserve the right to use overwhelming superior forces to respond to WMD attacks.35The National Security Strategy in 2006 reaffirmed the major role of nuclear weapons in the maintenance of the U.S. security and requested to strengthen deterrence. The National Defense Strategy in 2008, the new triad of strategic forces, became the cornerstone of strategic deterrence.

Although President Obama has declared to devalue the role of nuclear weapons in the U.S. national security strategy, he has still adhered to the deterrent strategy. The Nuclear Posture Review Report in 2010 clearly points out that signing new START does not mean that nuclear deterrence is out of date. The report states that it would maintain safe, effective and reliable nuclear forces if there are still nuclear weapons in the world.36Nuclear deterrence actually has become an important part and a major principle of the Obama Administration’s national security policy and foreign policy.

After the end of the Cold War, the major threats that the United States faces is from “the rogue states” and non-state actors like terrorist groups, which can hardly become the targets of nuclear weapons. If the United States continues to rely on nuclear deterrence, the risk of using nuclear weapons will become bigger and will in fact lead to horizontal nuclear proliferation, and also means that it needs to constantly modernize its nuclear weapons, which will lead to vertical proliferation.

Therefore, to develop or acquire WMD to prevent the U.S. strikes has become the best option for those countries without conventional weapons superiority or nuclear weapons and facing the U.S. conventional forces superiority and nuclear deterrence. Up to today, the international community has not found any sign that a country gives up developing new ballistic missiles due to the U.S. deployment of missile defense systems. Therefore, the United States with overwhelming destructive forces will certainly make others not use military forces against it, but is very likely to stimulate weak countries to acquire WMD.

Third, to rely on pre-emption to implement non-proliferation actually has stimulated proliferation.

Since the United States formulates the pre-emptive strategy, both the academic circles and the international community all strongly question the strategy and believe it is against the international law and the norms of international relations. Therefore, the pre-emption strategy has lead to many problems.

Pre-emption has indeed played some role in non-proliferation including destructing of some countries’ facilities of biological and chemical weapons and forcing some countries to halt or submit biological and chemical weapons facilities or programs. But in general, proliferation problems caused by pre-emption are more than the problems it has solved. One document of the Department of Defense states that the U.S. unmatched conventional military superiority forces its enemies seek unconventional and asymmetric means to strike the U.S. Achilles heel.37But, if the United States decides to hold a military strike on a country that develops nuclear weapons, both this country and others will believe it is precisely the country has developed nuclear weapons that prevents the U.S. military strikes, and will help many countries recognize the role of WMD and become determined to develop them to stop the U.S. pre-emptive strikes. Therefore, carrying out pre-emption strategy exacerbates proliferation, which will be the inevitable outcome.

The last, the fundamental goal of the U.S. non-proliferation strategy after the end of the Cold War is to prevent its adversary or potential rivalry from acquiring WMD, its technologies and materials, and to consolidate and maintain its hegemony and strategic superiority.

In different period of history, the U.S. non-proliferation policy has served different goals. Since taking office, President Obama has reformed and readjusted the U.S. non-proliferation policy, however the goal to maintain the U.S. military and strategic superiority has not changed at all. Obviously, the non-proliferation policy to freeze its potential enemies’ developing WMD and to prevent them from challenging the U.S. strategic superiority has more likely encouraged proliferation because it is not conducive for the big powers to build mutual strategic trust and maintain mutual cooperation. Russia has increased its dependence on nuclear weapons due to its weakening conventional forces. However, since the end of the Cold War, the United States has deployed missile defense system under the pretext of prevent “the rogue states” from launching missile attacks. But the U.S. deployment of missile defense system makes Russia become more vulnerable.38Therefore, Russia is very sensitive to the U.S. deployment of missile defense system and has linked the deployment to nuclear disarmament in Russia-U.S. negotiations and made great efforts to develop and deploy new modernized missiles that are able to break through the U.S. missile defense systems. If this situation goes on, non-proliferation will eventually become a castle in the air.

At the same time, the goal of non-proliferation will promote other nuclear weapon states to upgrade their nuclear arsenals and stimulate some non-nuclear weapon states to develop them. The reason is quite simple: since the most powerful country in the world needs to protect national security through maintaining the safe, reliable and effective nuclear weapons, other nuclear weapon states need to upgrade their nuclear arsenals and non-nuclear states to develop nuclear weapons. Such views have been clearly expressed at the Nuclear Security Summits. As for how to realize the security of the nuclear facilities, the Summits did not reach any mandatory standards nor make any common and universal obligations on stopping producing weapon useable material.39At the UN General Assembly on disarmament, many countries like Algeria, Egypt, Kuwait, Libya clearly express that they would oppose non-proliferation measures including strengthening the UN to verify member countries’ nuclear programs.40Therefore, the U.S. non-proliferation policy is the major reason to a large extent that has exacerbated WMD proliferation since the end of the Cold War.

Concluding Remarks:

Since the end of the Cold War, in order to deal with the increasingly serious proliferation situation, the United States has established and improved domestic non-proliferation mechanisms and legal systems, insisted on constantly strengthening nuclear and conventional deterrence. It has also constantly criticized other countries for modernizing their nuclear weapons, used hegemonic means to promote non-proliferation goal, and initiated pre-emption so as to prevent “the rogue states” from developing or acquiring WMD, which has indeed achieved some success, however it has also caused more serious WMD proliferation.

Abolition of WMD is the ideal goal of the human society. To realize this ideal can neither depend on deterrence and block politics, nor on satisfying some countries’ security and sacrificing others’. Fundamentally speaking, the success of non-proliferation policy at least depends on reduction of security threats. If the United States truly wants to prevent WMD proliferation, as the sole superpower, it must abandon selective non-proliferation, block politics and bias against different ideologies and social systems, and give up the maintenance of the U.S. hegemony, the policies of the first use of nuclear weapons and use of nuclear weapons to revenge conventional, chemical and biological weapons attacks and should equally, and fairly treat all proliferation acts. Otherwise, WMD and its related technologies will eventually proliferate more widely in the world.

End Notes：

1.Barry R Schneider and William L. Dowdy eds., “Pulling Back from the Nuclear Brink”, (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998), pp. 60～66; Barry R. Schneider, “Future War and Counterproliferation: U. S. Military Responses to NBC Proliferation Threats” (London: Praeger, 1999), pp. 49～51; Brad Roberts, "From Nonproliferation to Antiproliferation,"Vol. 18, No. 1(Summer 1993), pp. 139～173; Henry Sokolski, "Fighting Proliferation With Intelligence," Orbis, Vol. 38, Issue2(Spring 1994), pp. 245～260.

2.Daniel H. Joyner, "The Proliferation Security Initiative: Nonproliferation, Counterproliferation, and International Law, ", Vol. 30, Issue 2(Summer 2005); Pete V. Domenici, "Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Winter 1995), pp.145-152.

3.Thomas W. Graham, "Winning the Nonproliferation Battle," Arms Control Today, Vol. 21, July 1991, pp. 8～13; James F. Leonard and Adam M Scheinman, "Denuclearizing South Asia: Global Approaches to a Regional Problem,", Vol. 23, June 1993, pp. 17～22.

4.The Center for Counterproliferation Research, “At the Crossroads: Counterproliferation and National Security Strategy” (Washington, D. C.: National Defense University Press, April 2004); Robert S. Chase, Emily B. Hill and Paul Kennedy, "Pivotal States and U. S. Strategy,", Vol. 75, No. 1(Jan/Feb 1996), p. 37; John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War,", Vol. 15, No. 1(Summer 1990), p. 54; Ted Galen Carpenter, "A New proliferation Policy,"，Vol. 33，Summer 1992，pp. 63～72;

5.Peter A. Clausen, “Nonproliferation and the National Interest” (HarperCollins College Publishers, 1993),p. xii; Barry R. Schneider, “Future War and Counter proliferation”, pp. 2～3; Thomas W. Graham, “Winning the Nonproliferation Battle”, p. 13; David A V. Fischer, “Stopping the Spread of Nuclear Weapons: The Past and the Prospects”, (Routledge, 1992); Ira Straus, "Reversing Proliferation,", Vol. 45, Fall 2004, p. 63; Dingli Shen, "Can Sanctions Stop Proliferation?"，Vol. 31, No.3(Summer 2008)，pp. 89～99.

6.Gregory J. Rattray, “Explaining Weapons Proliferation: Going Beyond the Security Dilemma”, INSS Occasional Paper 1, July 1994; William Kincade, “Nuclear Proliferation: Diminishing Threat?” INSS Occasional Paper 6, December 1995; Center for Counterproliferation Research, At the Crossroads, p. 2.

7.Counterproliferation Program Review Committee (CPRC), Report on Activities and Programs for Courtering Proliferation and NBC Terrorism, Executive Summary, May 2003.

8.Alan C. Bridges, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: U. S. Policy and Practice in the Late 1990's Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, April 1999.

(9)Mary Beth Nikitin and Paul K. Kerr, “Proliferation Control Regimes: Background and Status”, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report, RL31559, October 18, 2010, p. 37.

10. Fact Sheet, "Designation of Iranian Entities and Individuals for Proliferation Activities and Support for Terrorism," October 25, 2007, available at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/oct/94193.htm.

11. Department of Commerce, Export Administration Annual Report Fiscal Year 1998, p. 35.

12. Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), Export Controls and Nonproliferation Policy (Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office), May 1994, pp. 43～46.

13.ACDA Annual Report (1995), available at: http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/acda/reports/anrpt_95.htm.

14. Amy F. Woolf, Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements”, CRS Report, RL33865, April 9, 2008.

15. CPRC, Report on Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation and NBC Terrorism, Vol. I, Executive Summary, July 2009, p. 17.

16. Kenneth Watman and Dean Wilkening,”U. S. Regional and Deterrence Strategies” (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1995), pp. 13～14.

17. Amy F. Woolf, US Nuclear Weapons: Changes in Policy and Force Structure, CRS Report, RL31632, February 23, 2004, p. 24.

18.Walter Pincus, "Life Span of US Nuclear Weapons Will Increase Under Plan," Washington Post, May 18, 2011.

19. Elaine M. Grossman, "U. S. Defense Conference Bill Seeks New Submarine Cost Assessment," Global Security Newswire, December 16, 2011.

20.Statement of Thomas P. D'Agostino, Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and Administrator National Nuclear Security Administration, "U. S. Department of Energy on the Nuclear Posture Review Before the House Armed Services Committee," April 14, 2010.

21. Center for Counterproliferation Research, At the Crossroads, p. 35.

22.Christine Kucia, "Counterproliferation at Core of New Security Strategy," Arms Control Today, Vol. 32, October 2002; John Steinbruner, "Confusing Ends and Means: The Doctrine of Coercive Pre-emption," Arms Control Today, Vol. 33, January/February 2003.

23.The While House, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 11, 2002.

24. Stephen Rademaker, "Blame America First," The Wall Street Journal, May 7, 2007, p. 15.

25. Kerry Boyd and Seth Brugger, from Arms Control Association, Briefing Paper on the Status of Biological Weapons Nonproliferation, Updated, May 2003.

26. Suzanne Nossel, "Smart Power," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 2(March/April 2004), p. 131.

27.Cole Harvey, "Obama Sets New Course on Arms Control," Arms Control Today, Vol. 39, March 2009.

28.Democratic National Committee, "The 2008 Democratic National Platform: Renewing America's Promise," available at: http://www.democrats.org/a/party/platform.html.

29. "Statement of Deputy Secretary of State James B. Steinberg at Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference," April 6, 2009.

30. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, January 2001, p. 74.

31.OTA, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risk (Washington, DC:, Government Printing Office, August 1993), pp. 65～66.

32. National Air and Space Intelligence Center, Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, June 2009.

33. The 1994 Nuclear Posture Reuiew, July 8, 2005, available at: http://www.nukestrat.com/us/reviews/npr1994.htm.

34.Sharon A. Squassoni, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and Missiles: Status and Trends, CRS Report, RL30699, Updated January 14, 2005.

35.The White House, Nation Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 2002, p. 3; Nikholas Kralev, "Bush Signs Paper Allowing Nuclear Response," Washington Times, January 31, 2003.

36. U. S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010; The White House, National Security Strategy, May 2010, p. 4.

37. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, November 1997, p. 4.

38. David E. Sanger, "Obama Reaps Vows to Secure Nuclear Stocks," New York Times, April 14, 2010, A6.

39. "Washington Nuclear Security Summit Work Plan," available at: http://www.america.gov/

40. Colum Lynch, "The Nuclear Backlash Begins," Foreign Policy, April 20, 2010.