Dynamic Development of Armaments in East Asia after the Cold War

By Guo Rui and Wang Xiaoge



Dynamic Development of Armaments in East Asia after the Cold War

By Guo Rui and Wang Xiaoge

Department of International Relations, Jiling University.

The end of the Cold War contributes to the relative ease of the world situation, and created a more favorable political and military environment for international arms control and disarmament. However, regional contradictions temporarily suppressed down during the U.S.-Soviet confrontation cropped up in large numbers, and regional instability is further worsened. The Gulf War has led some countries believe firmly that military strength is a prime means to respond effectively to external invasion and to protect their national security, so the regional arms expansion1and global disarmament process present an interesting trend of reverse operation. Since the year 1990, the Middle East and East Asia are the world's two largest arms input regions. Entering the new century, military spending and arms purchases of many East Asian countries (regions) continue to show a rising trend, which become well-armed in the world today.

Due to historical and practical reasons, the East Asian countries generally are lack of the necessary strategic mutual trust, and have maintained a high vigilance on the arms development. Thus, many views argue that the "security dilemma" is the main motivation leading to an arms race2among East Asian countries in the post-Cold War. Among them, China's rapid rise and military growing strength have attracted wide attention. "China threat theory" holds that the rapid growth of China's military strength causes a high degree of vigilance and preventive measures by East Asian countries. However, from China stance, its military modernization is absolutely necessary "not only for deterrence and prevention of Taiwan independence, but also for safeguarding its basic security and independence. "China threat theory" cannot obviously explain the military modernization of Japan, the ROK and Singapore since the 1990s, because then the growth of China's military just began. In addition, the security dilemma theory recognizes the external factors while ignoring the internal factors of arms development, therefore, cannot fully explain the arms development in East Asia either.

On the driving force for armaments development, in terms of equipment economics, there are two aspects of supply and demand. The demand-pull includes elements of national security, military modernization, national prestige, military interests and benefits, etc.; and the supply-push includes commercial interests, foreign policy considerations, strategic necessity, etc. So it obviously covers both external factors and domestic factors. Doing studies on military spending and armaments development, Defense Economics proposes the arms race model and the neo-classical model, the former emphasizes "action-reaction", the latter stresses combined economic, political and military factors.3Therefore, armaments studies deem "external competitive pressures" and "purely domestic factors" dynamic factors to contribute to arms development. For most countries in times of peace, the mere external or internal factors are difficult to play a unique and decisive role. British scholars B. Buzan and E. Herring4from three perspectives of "action-reaction", "domestic structure" and "technological imperative" to explain the growth of armaments development. This paper applies this three-perspective model to a comprehensive study of realistic arms development in East Asia after the end of the Cold War.

I. The Realities of Arms Development in East Asia in the Post-Cold War

After the end of the Cold War, East Asia armament build-up shows continuous growth, reflected in non-stop increase of military spending and significant growth in arms trade. According to SIPRI Statistics, in 2011 military spending of East Asia was US$ 250 billion, up 4% than that in 2010, and an increase by 130% compared with USA$ 108.6 billion in 1991.5Take China, Japan and the ROK in Northeast Asia, and Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam in Southeast Asia as statistical entries,6during the 1991-2011 period, military spending of these countries shows a significant growth. Among them, developed countries such as Japan and the ROK, due to the existing large military budget, show relatively small growth rate. Japan's military spending grows from US$ 50.5 billion to US$ 54.5 billion, a lowest increase, which is controlled by the "Peace Constitution", specifying military spending at around 1% of GDP, but Japan’s more than US$50 billion military spending ranks second for long in the world. Military spending of China and other developing countries in Southeast Asia records rapid growth. Southeast Asian countries except Singapore, have significant fluctuations in military spending growth, which is obviously affected by economic development. In recent years, Singapore has maintained a good momentum of sustained economic growth, so its rising military spending is leading other Southeast Asian countries.

Since the end of the Cold War, the overall size of the arms trade of East Asia continues to expand, the transaction amount increases significantly and stabilizes. Take the above-mentioned 8 countries for a study, during 1981-1990, their total imports of arms were approximately US$ 43.443 billion; in 1991-2000, reached about US$52.31 6 billion, an increase of 20%; during 2001-2010, further grew to US$ 52.974 billion, an increase of 1% compared to the previous decade. In 1991-2010, among the top 50 countries and regions of global arms imports, East Asia has 11 countries (regions) listed.7Compared with the 1980s, arms import situation in East Asia is not entirely linear-type growth. Take 10-year period as a measurement phase, China, Singapore and Malaysia have in 30 years gradual growth (after 2005 China shows a significant decline in military imports); South Korea and Thailand first record growth and then decrease; Vietnam and Indonesia show drastic decline in early years of the end of the Cold War and has returned to growth in recent decade; Japan arms imports show a decreasing trend.

During 1981-2010, Japan was the largest importer of arms in East Asia, followed by China, the ROK and Singapore. In the 1980s, China among the 8 countries had the smallest arms import, worth only US$ 713 million. In recent years, the reasons for Japanese to reduce armaments imports are that Japan's defense industry has made considerable progress, and established a relatively complete R&D and production system. Japan as early as the 1970s had basically realized modernization of armaments, and this process of most East Asian countries did not start until the 1990s. However, with the new generation of weapons in market, Japan's imports of armaments may have a significant growth. For example, in 2011, Japan decided to purchase the fourth-generation F-35, which is expected to cost US$ 10 billion.

In the process of arms development in East Asia, growth momentum of Navy and Air Forces is very strong. Before the 1990s, only Japan, the ROK, Singapore in East Asia had introduced a series of U.S.-made third-generation of F-15 and F-16, only China, Japan, Indonesia and the DPRK had submarines. Since 1989, the ROK has purchased a license from Germany to produce 6 pieces of 209 class conventional submarines, Singapore purchased from Sweden four Sjoormen class conventional submarines. After 2000, the ROK has purchased a license from Germany to produce 9 pieces of 214 class conventional submarines, Malaysia purchased from France 2 "scorpionfish" class conventional submarines, Vietnam bought 6 Russian "Kilo" class conventional submarines. Thailand, Myanmar and other countries are also considering buying submarines so East Asia is becoming the world's most concentrated areas of submarines. In addition, most East Asian countries in recent years have purchased the third-generation fighter, mainly focusing on the U.S-.made F-15 model and the F-16 model, and the Russian-made Su-27 model and Su-30 model. Navy, Air Forces armaments build-up become the most concentrated and the most eye-catching aspect in East Asia after the Cold War. Among them, the number of warship purchased by Japan and the ROK is relatively small, thanks to their more developed shipbuilding industries and the basic realization of ships-building localization.

As it can be seen, military spending and arms purchase of the East Asian region in the post-Cold War have seen a obvious growth momentum, but East Asian countries military spending share of GDP does not change significantly, still generally lower than the overall level before the end of the Cold War. The military spending of their GDP share in the post-Cold War shows a decline first before rising again. In the early post-Cold War, Vietnam’s military spending accounted for the highest proportion of GDP, reaching 5.6%; military spending of other East Asian countries except for Japan in percentage of GDP showed a downward trend. Among them, the lowest is with Indonesia, below 1% of GDP; China maintained below 2% of GDP in 1994-2000 and stabilized at around 2% after 2000; the ROK kept between 2.5% -3.0% of GDP. It is worth noting that Singapore had the highest post-Cold War military spending share of GDP, accounting for 5.4% at peak and 3.7% the lowest. But generally speaking, most East Asian countries military spending share of GDP is controlled within a more reasonable range.

Besides, China's arms development has seen indeed a remarkable growth in the past 20 years, but China's arms imports are minimal in East Asia before the 1990s, which from one side shows the growth of China's military spending is a "compensatory growth". The military spending of China, Japan and the ROK has no convergence, the higher growth rates of China's military spending on the basis of a small budget did not cause the corresponding military growth with that of Japan and the ROK, so there is no arms race between these three countries. Remarkably, military spending growth is largely influenced by the level of the domestic economy. For example, affected by the 1997 Asian financial crisis, military spending of Southeast Asian countries was in general decline. These phenomena illustrate dynamic factors impacting arms development in East Asia are multiple, and cannot simply be attributed to the so-called "competitive pressures on one another."

II. The Internal Demand and the Rationality of East Asian Arms Development

Studies on the impact of the internal demand on arms development began in the 1970s, but then the "action - reaction" model cannot fully explain the armaments build-up momentum of the two superpowers. As a result of prolonged U.S.-Soviet confrontation, the arms R&D and production facilities of the two countries had almost become "permanent" department, the military technological progress also became a self-evolving process, military-industrial enterprises were in high-speed operation driven by the production law. Armaments production and related political, economic sectors and individuals were gradually integrated into the national system, which had become an important part of national life. Under this circumstances, domestic factors became one of the main power sources affecting armaments development of the U.S. and the USSR. This analysis is mainly applied to arms-producing countries, because non-arms-producing countries had no large-scale military industry, neither the military-industrial complex like that in the United States.8Moreover, the internal demand factors for armaments development are not limited to the institutionalization of military production, but also include arms whole life cycles, economic growth, electoral politics, domestic security threats, sectorial interests and military threats promoting domestic coherence, etc.. Among these factors, upgrading weapons, institutionalizing military production and internal security threats are the main motivating factors to facilitate the production of arms development in East Asia.

Sustained economic growth ensures some East Asian countries the capacity to increase military spending. A military need of a country means that it is willing and able to pay for the purchase of military equipments and purchasing power is the basic premise of armaments development. As early as 1995, the United Nations Disarmament Commission pointed out that military spending growth can be attributed to the growing affluence in many countries, which makes them get more sophisticated hardware;9Since the end of the Cold War, East Asian economy has maintained rapid growth momentum. In 1991-2010, of these eight countries, China records the fastest economic growth with average annual economic growth of 10.47 percent, Japan the slowest with 1%, and other 6 countries between 4% -8%, so the average economic growth rate of eight countries was 5.72%, which was still significantly higher than the global average economic growth rate of 2.7% over the same period.10In addition to Japan, the ROK, Singapore and others with better economic conditions, most East Asian countries at the beginning of the end of the Cold War face serious embarrassment of aging weaponry.

In the 1980s, China's defense spending was in low-input, and in 1979-1989, Chinese consumers price index (CPI) rose 7.49% annually, but its defense spending was actually in a negative growth;11and its defense expenditure at constant prices fell by 26.33%, reducing 1/4 of purchasing power.12Entering the 1990s, the significantly improved economic conditions has ensured its military spending in a new stage of "compensatory growth", China accelerates updating serious aging military equipments.

During the Cold War, the Southeast Asian region witnessed the U.S.-Soviet confrontation and there was a confrontation between ASEAN and Vietnam in the 1970s, so the military spending was the governments’ priority. True, both the United States and the Soviet Union found ways to moved in some modern conventional armaments, but the complex territorial disputes and civil wars stopped them from handing in the most advanced conventional weapons to the region. The major portion of purchases was mostly made in the 1960s and 1970s, so there is a serious aging problem. For example, in 1995, of 113 warships and more than 1,500 gun-boats of the ASEAN navy, those with modern tactical and technical performance built in the last 10-15 years accounted for only 15%-20%. After the Cold War, international arms dealers compete for arms market share in the region. Continuous improvement in national economic conditions in Southeast Asia also provides buyers with certain purchasing power.

Institutionalization of military production is an important impetus to armaments development by arms-producing countries such as China, Japan and the ROK. Armaments R&D needs huge investments to create permanent institutions, and maintain long-term effective operation of military-industrial enterprises. Since R &D and industrial production facilities have their inherent cyclical and spontaneity, once formed certain scales, will produce intrinsic motivation so as to push forward technology and production. Institutionalization of military R&D and production create special interest groups and departmental interests, which influence the military spending decision-making, and has become an engine for armaments development. In overall view, the military-industrial sectors of China, Japan and the ROK play an important roles domestically. China has established a complete defense industrial production system, and is an arms-producing country, with technology leading in some areas. Japan has established a R&D capacity at the advanced level in Asia, and is also listed in the world's advanced countries. In the past two decades, the ROK strives to create independent "self-defense" so its defense industry has rapid development with technical and tactical performance by homemade weapons. For arms-producing countries to maintain the necessary military R & D and production scale, they need to attain full military procurement orders. When national military demand is unable to meet, efforts would be made to seek arms exports.

Internal security threats in some Southeast Asian countries are dynamic factors to promote the growth of military power. Compared with Northeast Asian countries, Southeast Asian countries face more complex ethnic and religious issues. Over the years, many Southeast Asian countries suffer from serious internal security problems, such as rebels carried out long-term confrontations and constantly violent armed conflicts with government forces in Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines and others. For instance again, Ethnic and religious issues in Indonesia's Aceh, Papua regions are very obvious with regional separatism prevalent; ethnic and religious conflicts in southern Thailand are also very serious, and the southern armed groups have advocated the establishment of an independent country by force or merger with neighbor Malaysia with the "same language and kind"; Muslim Moro people in southern Philippines have serious differences with the mainstream national ethnic in faith, religion, national identity, economic interests and political rights, etc. so violence has never stopped. After the 9 /11 attacks, Southeast Asia became one of the hardest hit regions by terrorists, which witnesses this countercurrent from Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, and extended to Thailand, Myanmar and Cambodia, so shadows of "al Qaeda" organization can be found everywhere.13Terrorists, separatists and extremists colluding together becomes the biggest security threat currently in Southeast Asia. As a result, to respond to internal violence has become an important driving force for arms development, however, which demands for small arms, and takes more military resources like personnel, vehicles .etc. In addition, the domestic electoral politics, sectorial interests and other factors also become the inherent engine driving arms development of East Asian countries. "Security threats abroad is an effective means of obtaining domestic political support", thereby, Japan has long-term prioritized Russia’s strategic pressure and the DPRK's military threat as a primary security issue to consider, and in recent years also targets at China. It is true that the military plays an important role in the political life of some Southeast Asian countries, but did not drive the military build-up.

III. The "Action-Reaction" and the Competition of East Asian Arms Development

From the perspective of "action-reaction" to observe the armaments development is a classic method, which has laid an important foundation for the concept of "arms race." The "Action-reaction" concept mainly believes that national military build-up is promoted by external factors, and that an action by any potentially hostile country to strengthen military power is viewed as increasing threat by the counterpart, which then reacts to strengthen its own military forces.14The logical starting point of this view is mistrust and fears between countries caused by international anarchy, so a country has to take natural, and necessary measures in order to protect its own security, whose military approaches, even "purely" for defensive purpose, would be viewed as countermeasures to reduce the counterpart security; so reaction must be taken. Such an interaction process, thereby, shapes up a so-called "security dilemma", and eventually leads to more insecurity in the world.15

In order to study "action-reaction" factor of East Asian armaments growth, the paper identified three key variables: One, whether there is distrust among East Asian countries, which considered each other rivals or competitors. Two, whether there is the military deployment targeted at each other among countries in the region. Three, whether military spending and arms procurement in the region have inherent linkages. Through studying these three main variables to understand better any important impact of "action-reaction" factor on national arms development in East Asia.

Currently, psychologically mutual defense against each other among East Asian countries is in existence extensively, which stems from factors such as complex historical problems, territorial disputes and maritime rights disputes in the region. In Northeast Asia, political and security mutual trust seriously lag behind the level of economic cooperation, and China, Japan and the ROK show mutual militarily defense psychologically. Japan and the ROK maintain a high vigilance at China 's military modernization and hold that China's military modernization has not clarified its purpose, and its continuously rising military spending will undermine their national defense strategy, etc.16

In Southeast Asia, there exist a complex game-play within ASEAN, and between ASEAN and East Asian countries. The ASEAN countries are plagued by widespread distrust and border disputes. The ASEAN "consultation and consensus" principle can hardly make effective arbitration. To abandon the pursuit of regional interests, peace and exchanges are common in Southeast Asia countries17. The Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei, etc. also have maritime rights disputes with China. A few ASEAN countries argue that in Asia, the rising China and its enhanced military power are worrisome.18Particularly in 1992, after China confirmed the sovereignty of the Nansha Islands in legal form, then all ASEAN countries for the first time ask for the U.S. role in maintaining the strategic balance in the Asia-Pacific region, and also draw in Japan to play a greater role in East Asian political, diplomatic and security affairs, but maintain a certain vigilance at Japan as well.

Wide-spread distrust and targeted military deployments in East Asia in recent years become increasingly clearer. Japan's National Defense documents escalate its language used on China. Japan also has decided to deploy the "coastal monitoring team" close to China, and land-based anti-ship missile systems in relevant areas; and increase MSDF submarines from 16 to 22, and the fighters division of Air Self-Defense Force in Naba base to 2 from 1, the fundamental purpose of which is to respond to "the frequent activities by Chinese military power in the East China Sea." The ROK is building the "Dokdo Island Fleet" composed of 2 KDX-3 class "Aegis" guided missile destroyers, 3 KDX-2 class missile destroyers, 2 garrison ships and 2 conventionally powered submarines in order to enhance the controlling ability, and respond to territorial and maritime rights and interests disputes with China and Japan.

Most Southeast Asian countries have joined thethrough mutual confidence-building measures and security cooperation, suspicions and mistrusts among members are alleviated to some extent. Therefore the level of their hostility is reduced and the targeted deployment is not particularly prominent. However, On the South China Sea disputes, the ASEAN countries in a joint approach intend to enhance their negotiations power with China, with the help of their military strategy from land-based and inward-oriented turning to maritime-based and outward-oriented as well as arms procurement and military deployment by some countries. ASEAN countries military spending and arms purchases show that in addition to dealing with the security pressure of the regional major powers, a strong psychological alert to its neighbors are maintained. Thus, an increase in military spending or the national introduction of advanced weapons will "naturally" be followed by the neighbors.

Compared with Southeast Asian countries, military budgets of China, Japan and the ROK have no obvious linkage in growth. In most years after the end of the Cold War, the arms imports of the three countries had no linkages, and regarding military spending or arms imports, the gap between Southeast Asian countries and the three countries is to too huge to draw definitive conclusions.

The above phenomena show arms development in East Asia has certain "action-reaction" features, but such features are even more evident with Southeast Asian countries. However, military spending and arms imports of ASEAN are much less than that of China, Japan and the ROK so the features are largely reflected in the competition within ASEAN. It is true that the three countries are lack of security mutual trusts but their growing military spending and arms imports especially continuous growth of China's military spending has not lead to an arms race in Northeast Asia.

IV. Technological Imperative and the Internal and External Factors of Arms Development in East Asia

Internal and external factors for arms development are not isolated, and become increasingly complementary under the conditions of globalization. Due to distrust in the international environment, development of armaments by one country's domestic demand can cause serious anxiety of others, thus becoming the driving force for their arms development. Continuation of this "action-reaction" model cycle will form a new force of arms build-up. In East Asian environment of lack of mutual security trust, military modernization has caused a number of countries fears, so continuously upgrade their armaments. This process also has a close relationship with the (military) technological imperative19. In the process of technological innovation, "a society is forced to make large investments along this route, neither has a choice, nor be avoided"20. A new military revolution since the 1980s has changed the nature and form of war, the world's military powers compete for R&D of high-tech weapons systems. The spread of military technology on a global scale makes the technological imperative gradually flow from developed countries to developing countries. And technological imperative provides the armaments development environment, thereby, promoting the technology level of military equipments and national security in a process of frequent changes. Only a country continuously upgrades and replaces those existing weapons, is it able to prevent its capability of safeguarding national security from being weakened, which depends on the creation of and maintenance of a permanent armaments R&D and production system to constantly promote new changes of military technology. This cycling process is the basic model for "technological imperative" to affect a national or regional armaments development.

The current world military technology standards are set by developed countries, and largely by the United States. For example in the world today, U.S.-made F-15 series and F-16 series have set a standard for the third-generation fighter, and F-22 series and F-35 series aircraft have set fourth-generation fighter standards. These technical standards are leading the world. Take for example the naval build-up in East Asia, from the perspective of technological imperative, an important cause of the rapid growth of the naval armaments in East Asia can be attributed to continuous introduction of the "Aegis" systems. In service for more than 30 years, "Aegis" systems represent the world's most advanced naval technology. In addition, advanced weapons systems such as AIP submarines, etc. are technically originated in developed countries, and then quickly spread to East Asia and build up new military security standards, so that the regional arms are continuously updated and upgraded.

The technological imperative of arms development of Southeast Asian countries also has its own distinctive features. Compared to Technology absorption and conversion capabilities of China, Japan and the ROK, most Southeast Asian countries are lack of autonomy in the technological imperative. In the huge waves of changing military technology in the world, Southeast Asian countries at a low-level of armaments production, can only purchase main equipments overseas, etc., in fact, these weapons systems are not necessarily suitable for them. In Malaysia, for example, in 1995 the introduced MiG -29 fighters were forced into early retirement in 2010 and an official explanation is maintenance costs are too high, indicating that the introduction of this type of aircraft was not successful. However, military technological innovations will not slow down, so the military procurement of these countries will follow continuously. Therefore, the "technological imperative" promotes enthusiasm of Southeast Asian countries to purchase advanced military equipments, but also leads them to the development of armaments with certain blindness.

V. Conclusion

Dynamic factors of arms development in East Asia after the Cold War are multifaceted, which include both internal factors for normal replacement and upgrades, the realistic needs to deal with internal security, and continuous push by institutionalization of military production, etc., and also external security stress of security distrust, territorial and maritime rights disputes, in addition to a significant role played by the technological imperative through both internal and external factors. These dynamic factors come from both reasonableness of internal demand, and also from competition of external stimuli. But, the military spending percentage of GDP in most East Asian countries is controlled within a reasonable range. Therefore, the current arms development in East Asia has not brought about a significant war risk, only shown signs of arms competition to some extent.

Currently, the strategic architecture in East Asia is the Chinese economic and military rapid development, and the U.S. strategic focus moves eastwards. The U.S. strengthening its military deployment in East Asia may enhance the Sino-U.S. strategic competition and security competition. This means that in next 10 years, the intensity of the Sino-U.S. strategic competition in East Asia may exceed their strategic cooperation in other regions.21

The future arms development in East Asia faces three possibilities: One, competition is intensified so significantly that it reaches an arms race. Two, competition is intensified somewhat, but is still at a manageable level. Three, competition is mitigated, and significant progress is made on security cooperation in East Asia. The first scenario is unlikely, since East Asian countries have closer economic and trade links. In comparison, the second scenario is the high possibility, because China apparently will not take the initiative to provoke an arms race with the United States. Strategic competition between China and the United States with its allies or "protectorate" will continue to exist even gets intensified, but with the Chinese growing technological capacity, probability of an arms race is much reduced. The possibility of the third scenario appears minimal due to the growing clearer dominance and the gradual weakening of strategic competition in East Asia.

Notes:

1. "Arms" refer to two major aspects of personnel and equipments. In the Research of armaments, this concept refers to more weapons and equipments. Armament issues discussed in this article are mainly limited to weapons and equipments, and focus on conventional weaponry. Related definition, see Zhuo Mingxin, eds.: "Military Dictionary" (a), Beijing: Great Wall Press, 2000, pp. 1219.

2."Arms race" concept is widely used, but more often used as "a means to belittle opponents military policy." [English], Barry Buzan, Eric Herring: "The Arms Dynamic In World Politics," Translation by Xueli Tao, Sun Xiaochun, Changchun, Jilin People's Publishing House, 2005, p.87.

3. Chen Bo, eds, "Defense Economics", Beijing: Economic Science Press, 2010, pp. 199.

4. [English], Barry Buzan, Eric Herring: "The Arms Dynamic In World Politics," p.93.

5. The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, Military Expenditure by Region in Constant US Dollars, 1988-2011.

6. Geographically, the East Asian region is the part of the eastern edge of the Asian continent, including China, Japan, the Korean Peninsula, Mongolia and the Russian Far East. East Asia is also broadly defined as the Northeast Asia (including China, Japan, the Korean Peninsula, Mongolia, the Russian Far East) and Southeast Asia (including Indochina archipelago, Malaysia archipelago, Indonesia and the Philippines archipelago islands). This definition is commonly used in the Western academia and media.

7. Including China, South Korea, China’s Taiwan, Japan, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Vietnam.

8. [English], Barry Buzan, Eric Herring: "The Arms Dynamic In World Politics," p.121.

9. Michael T. Klare, "The Next Great Arms Race", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, 1993, p. 138.

10. According to the data by the World Bank, published on the website.

11. Yao Jiawei, "Questioning China's defense expenditure: how the 480 billion is decided?", China News Weekly, No. 10, 2009, p.58.

12. Yuan Mingquan, "The scales of China's military spending in the coming years",No.6, 1992, p.45.

13. Shi Wen, "Southeast Asian anti-terrorism situation is still grim", http://www.chinanews.com.hk/cgi-bin/shownews.pl filename = 0407-02.CNA & date = 20040407 & type = cna?.

14. [Engli p.97.

15. [Ancient Greece] Thucydides: "History of the Peloponnesian War," Xusong Yan, HUANG Xian full translation, Guilin: Guangxi Normal University Press, 2004, page 15.

16. "Lee: China's military spending increases the risk of bringing the arms race", http://cn.reuters.com/article/wtNews/idCNChina3868020090305.

17. Wangzai Chang, Kuo and new: the "national interest or regional interests - political economy of ASEAN cooperation," Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 2005, pp. 95.

18. Etel Solingen, "ASEAN, Quo Vadis Domestic Coalitions and Regional Cooperation",, Vol. 21, No. 1, April 1999, p. 44.

19. The "technological imperative" has a different translations in Chinese.

20. Langdon Winner, Autonomous Technology Technics-out-of-control as a Theme in Political Thought, Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1977, p 104..

21. Yan Xuetong: "power centers shift change and the international system",2012, No. 6, p.10.