Birthday Onions 生日洋葱

莉齐·科林厄姆文 张爽译

What can we learn from wartime rationing？ 我們能从战时定量配给制度中学到什么？

In 1939 Britain was dependent on 22 million tons of food imports a year. It was not U-boats that were the greatest threat to the food supply， however， but rather a new lack of shipping space. For the government， which had expected neutral shipping to be widely available as it had been during the First World War， the scarcity came as a surprise. Within a year， as ships were diverted to troop-carrying duties and industrial raw mater-ials increasingly claimed cargo space， food imports fell to 11 million tons.

As soon as war was declared in September 1939 Neville Chamberlains government took over the food supply. Thus， the government immediately took responsibility for ensuring that every member of society was able to access sufficient food. Although the War Cabinet， and in particular the First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill， were reluctant to restrict civil liberties， the government brought in rationing. The Ministry of Food was determined not to repeat the mistake of the First World War， when rationing had been introduced only after shortages had already become a problem. By the summer of 1940 meat， fats， dairy products， eggs， sugar and tea were all rationed. For the first eighteen months， however， the government lacked a clear food supply strategy， and found itself solving one food shortage at a time. The recommendation to eke out the meat ration with oatmeal， for example， created a secondary shortage as it failed to take into account the limited facilities for milling oats. Wheat stocks fell first and eggs became scarce as the government prioritized milk production. Two-thirds of Britains farmland was pasture and the countrys livestock was also dependent on imports of feed. Cabinet Office economists warned that livestock was “eating shipping space”. Beef and mutton shortages became a serious problem. By the end of 1940 the government was forced to make up the meat ration with offal， which until then had been unrationed.

In January 1941， the journalist Maggie Joy Blunt wrote：

We are not starving， we are not even underfed but our usually well-stocked food shops have an empty and anxious air. Cheese， eggs， onions， oranges， luxury fruits and vegetables are practically unobtainable… Housewives are having to queue for essential foods. We live on potatoes， carrots， sprouts， swedes， turnips， artichokes and watercress… The meat ration was cut at the beginning of the month… Prices are rising.

At first the working classes were suspicious of the governments talk of sacrifice， fearing that the poorest would bear the brunt. （Then as now， Britain was riven by social inequality.） During the painful period of initial adjustment it was indeed the poorest and those in low-priority occupations who were worst affected.

After the anxious winter of 1940–41， the Ministries of Agriculture， Food and Health finally developed a comprehensive food strategy. Price controls were introduced to prevent inflation， pasture was ploughed up to grow wheat and potatoes， and the importation of condensed， high-calorie foods was prioritized. The ability to draw on the food resources of Britains trading empire was the real strength of the wartime food policy. Canadian bacon， New Zealand butter and cheese， West African palm oil， Argentinian de-boned and corned beef， American Spam， sausage meat， condensed milk and dried egg all provided 56 per cent of the populations calories. And in order to secure 2 million tons of these crucial imports， Churchill cut shipping to the Indian Ocean by 60 per cent. This exported hunger to the colonies， where a reduction in supplies left millions of Mauritians， East Africans and Indians to face malnutrition and famine.

Goods for which there was an erratic supply， such as tinned meat， fish and fruit， rice and biscuits， were given a price in points. The government was able to steer consumer choices by adjusting the number of points an item was worth. At the same time the system gave shoppers a psychologically beneficial illusion of control. Each ration-book holder was allocated sixteen points for four weeks. They could be sensible and spend everything on a pound of tinned sausage meat， enough to create several main meals， with the bonus of a thick layer of nearly half a pound of fat; or they could splurge eight points on a packet of biscuits. Indeed， the knowledge that the government felt responsible for ensuring a reliable and fairly distributed food supply made a significant contribution to wartime morale.

Lord Woolton was a gifted speaker. He recognized that if rationing was to work the government needed to be seen to distribute food equitably across the population. For this reason every adult no matter what his or her occupation received the same allocation. The wartime diet replicated the prewar working-class diet in that it relied heavily on bread and potatoes， which were not rationed. The idea was to stave off hunger by filling up on starchy staples. Rationing and rising wages gave even the poorest access to adequate quantities of meat， egg （albeit dried）， butter and milk. Indeed， pregnant and nursing women as well as children were given priority access to milk. Children were allocated cod liver oil， orange juice and tins of blackcurrant purée. The health of the poorest third of British society markedly improved， and by 1945 the stubborn pockets of deprivation in the industrial areas worst hit by the Depression had been virtually eradicated.

Rationing had the effect of levelling out the diet of everyone in the country to the standard of the prewar skilled worker. The dinner of lamb， potatoes and cabbage followed by date roll and custard that a lab technician enjoyed in September 1942 was remarkably similar to meals he had enjoyed in the 1930s. But while this kind of meal represented an improvement for the poor， used to scraping by on bread and margarine， a bit of bacon or cheese and copious amounts of sweet tea， to the upper and middle classes meals of this kind were a form of deprivation. The rich were able to circumvent rationing by buying expensive unrationed foods， including lobster and

1939年，英国一年要进口2200万吨食品。然而，对食物供应构成最大威胁的并不是德国U型潜艇，而是缺少舱位的新问题。英国政府本来寄希望于一战期间那样充足的中立国航运，对舱位的欠缺感到意外。这一年内，由于船只被用于运载军队，而且工业原料不断占据货舱，英国的食品进口量下降到1100万吨。

1939年9月英国宣战后，尼维尔·张伯伦政府就接管了食品供应。于是，政府立即承担起确保每个社会成员都能获得充足食物的责任。尽管战时内阁，尤其是海军大臣温斯顿·丘吉尔，不愿意限制公民自由，政府还是推行了定量配给制度。食品部决心不重蹈一战的覆辙，那时定量配给制度是在短缺已经成为难题之后才实行的。到1940年夏天，肉类、脂油、乳制品、鸡蛋、糖和茶都实行了定量配给。然而，在头18个月里，政府没有明确的食品供应战略，一次只能解决一种食品短缺的问题。例如，由于政府没有考虑到燕麦研磨设施的有限，用燕麦来补肉类配给不足的建议，造成了另一重短缺。由于政府优先生产牛奶，小麦库存首先下降，鸡蛋变得稀缺。英国三分之二的农田是牧场，牲畜依赖进口饲料。内阁办公厅的经济学家警告说，牲畜正在“吃掉舱位”。牛肉和羊肉短缺成为严重的问题。到1940年年底，政府被迫用动物内脏补充肉类配给，而在此之前，动物内脏一直是不配给的。

1941年1月，记者玛吉·乔伊·布伦特写道：