王柳伟+杨辉+黎继巧
摘 要 以农户作为单群体的新视角来看待问题,建立露天焚烧秸秆问题的单群体博弈模型,利用复制动力学来刻画农户的有限理性行为,并以此对模型的Nash平衡进行稳定性分析.研究发现:焚烧秸秆简单易行,短期来看,收益较好,却不知对环境造成的污染是很严重的;不焚烧秸秆成本高,但从长远来看,不焚烧秸秆的收益呈递增趋势;焚烧秸秆对环境造成破坏,不焚烧秸秆的整体社会收益远大于焚烧秸秆;最后,通过模型仿真来对问题进行分析验证,并提出建议与对策来解决露天焚烧秸秆问题.
关键词 群体博弈;复制动力学;秸秆露天焚烧;仿真实验
中图分类号 O225 文献标识码 A
Abstract We constructed a single population game model by regarding farmer as a single population, and characterized the bounded rational behavior by replication dynamics and analysized the stability of Nash equilibria based on that model. We show that the behavior of burning straw is simple and easy, and the benefits are high in the short term, but environmental pollutions are serious. Otherwise, the cost of not burning is high, but in the long term, the benefit of non-burning straw is increasing. Burning straw is harmful to the environment, and the social benefit of not burning straw is much higher than burning straw. Finally, the problem was analyzed and verified through simulation, and we gave suggestions and solutions to solve the problem of straw burning.
Key words population games; replication dynamics; crops straw opening burning; simulation experiment
1 引 言
氣候变化问题一直是各国的重要研究问题,引起气候变化的因素很多如工业废气排放、汽车尾气、城市建设等,但农作物秸秆露天焚烧也是引起气候变化(雾霾天气)的一个主要原因;如兰春剑等人[1]研究认为空气污染指数与秸秆焚烧火点数量呈正相关性,苏继峰[2]研究认为南京的雾霾天气主要是由秸秆露天焚烧造成的.
我国是一个农业大国,每年农作物收获季节都会产生大量的秸秆,毕于运等人[3]的研究发现,每年农作物秸秆可以产生8亿吨,如此巨大的数据引起了各级政府的关注,各级政府
加大监管措施,一定程度上遏制了露天焚烧秸秆问题,但收效甚微.秸秆如何处理成为一个急需解决的问题,一部分可直接还田,仍有……